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Adolf Reinach 
On the Theory 
of the Negative Judgment* 
I Investigations of Judgment in General1 
§ 1 The Ambiguity of the Term 'Judgment' 
It is of the utmost importance to uncover an equivocation bearing on 
the term 'judgment', one which, as it seems to me, makes itself felt in 
the form of confusions in very many logical contexts. On the one hand 
one understands by 'judgment' what one tends otherwise to characte-
rise as 'conviction', 'certainty', 'belief, also as 'consciousness of valid-
ity'. On the other hand one means by this term also 'affirmation' or 'as-
sertion'. Now certainly conviction and assertion stand in close relation 
to each other, but they are by no means identical. And whilst there is no 
doubt that one may well use' judgment' to designate both, for this very 
reason one must then emphasise much more carefully the fact that the 
two delineate - in quite different ways - two wholly heterogeneous lo-
gical spheres, and that they thereby divide the total field of the theory 
of judgment into two neighbouring but absolutely separate sub-fields. 
This must now be shown in more detail. We must separate the two 
just-mentioned concepts of judgment and at the same time distinguish 
them from other related formations with which they may be, and in-
deed have been in the past, confused. 
• English translation of "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils", Munchener Philosophi-
sche Abhandlungen, Festschrift for T. Lipps, A. Pfander, ed., Leipzig: Barth, 1911, 
196-254; repro in Reinach's Gesammelte Schriften, Halle: Niemeyer, 1921,56-102; 
new edition, Munich: Philosophia, forthcoming. (Chapter and section headings have 
been supplied by the translator.) 
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We begin with a term which has cropped up frequently in writings on 
the theory of judgment since the influential investigations of Franz 
Brentano in this field. Brentano designated the positive judgment as an 
'accepting' ['Anerkennen'l and opposed it to the negative judgment as it 
're jecting' [, Verwerfen' J. Certainly these terms cannot be understood 
unambiguously at this stage; and further those theorists who have em-
ployed them have by no means always avoided the dangerous ambigui-
ties which they contain. One speaks of acceptance and rejection first of 
all in the sense of an evaluative turning towards or away from; thus a 
moral deed is accepted, an immoral deed rejected. Brentano (1889, 
p. 56) and Marty (1908, p. 233) quite rightly emphasised that this con-
cept of a 'holding dear to oneself or of a 'feeling of agreeableness' has 
no place in the theory of judgment. What should it mean to say that in 
the judgment '2 x 2 = 4' the identity of 2 x 2 and 4 is 'esteemed', or 
that in the judgment '2 x 2 =t= 5' the identity of 2 x 2 and 5 is in this 
sense 'disapproved of? But the danger of a confusion of this kind is not 
great; much more must we be on our guard against another kind of con-
fusion. 
There is a notion of acceptance which has nothing in it of an actual 
esteeming, one which can more precisely be characterised as a consent .. 
ing. I hear, say, the judgment 'a is P' expressed; I understand it, reflect 
upon it, and then I utter a consenting 'Yes'. In this 'Yes' lies a consentf 
an acceptance; but even here the acceptance is not a judgment. For 
which judgment should it be? The judgment 'a is P'? Certainly not. For 
this judgment evidently relates to the being P of a, to this state of af-
fairs, but the acceptance which we now have before us relates rather to 
the judgment 'a is P'. And that the state of affairs is not the same as the 
judgment which posits it requires no special emphasis. I can even bring 
in the original judgment alongside, and say: 'Yes; a is indeed P' . Here 
we have consenting acceptance and judgment next to each other, as 
evidently different. I first of all consent, with my 'Yes' , to the original 
judgment, and then I judge for myself that a is P. Now one can desig-
nate this judgment too as an acceptance, that is, again, as the accep-
tance of the state of affairs which is the being P of a. And it is precisely 
here that there lies the danger of the confusion mentioned above. For 
consenting acceptance and judging acceptance are fundamentally differ .. 
ent, both as acts and in regard to their objectual correlates. If one want-
ed to make use of equivocation it might be said that what consenting 
acceptance accepts is precisely a judging acceptance. 2 Many confusions 
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in the theory of judgment are thus to be explained as arising through 
the substitution of consenting acceptance for the genuine judgment. It 
is to a large extent the term 'acceptance' which leads us astray here,3 
and the same considerations can be applied, of course, to the expres-
sions 'rejection' and 'disapproval ' . 
§ 2 The Sphere of Conviction and the Sphere of Assertion 
After excluding acceptance and rejection both in the sense of positive 
and negative esteem and in the sense of consent and refusal, we come to 
the question whether 'acceptance' possesses any unambiguous sense at 
all, at least within the sphere of judgment. We have already indicated 
that this is not the case. Let us take a concrete example. Imagine that 
there has arisen a question between myself and someone else concern-
ing the colour of a particular object. I step up to the object and I see 
that it is red. The being red of the object is here given to me, and as it 
comes to be given to me there develops within me the relevant convic-
tion or belief that the object is red. Here one can very properly talk of a 
judgment. Indeed we have here the point about which the concept of 
'belief in English philosophy is oriented. 
Let us follow through this case a little further. I turn away from the 
object, step up to the other person and say: 'The object is red. ' What is 
involved here? The conviction orginally attained can endure, I can hold 
fast to it, even when the object no longer stands before me. With this 
conviction I turn to the other person and utter the just-mentioned 
words. But it is not at all as though there was nothing involved here ex-
cept the conviction of the given state of affairs and the utterance of 
these particular words. In uttering these words I mean or intend some-
thing by them, something objectual which they designate, and I mean 
this in a positive, affirmative manner. Such positing or asserting displays 
the presence of an act of a quite peculiar type. This is shown by the fact 
that if I say: 'Is the object red? ' I also have something objectual in view, 
indeed I have the same thing in view as with the sentence: 'The object is 
red.' Here however we have not, as before, an assertive but rather an 
interrogative directedness. If we pay careful attention to the two cases 
then that which is characteristic of the case of assertion becomes clear. 
And again one may move to the case in which someone else makes the 
assertion 'a is P' and I repeat his sentence, understanding it, without 
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however sharing in its assertion. Once again it is exactly the same stat 
of affairs which is meant in the two cases, but only in the first case is it 
posited assertingly. 4 How the understanding repetition of an assertiv 
sentence is to be characterised positively must be left open; but in an 
case we can rule out any talk of its being itself an assertion. Thus we see 
that there are quite peculiar acts of positing or asserting; acts which are 
present in every positive judgment which we make. We shall study this 
asserting as it appears in judgments which are uttered, but we must take 
care not to reduce it to something purely linguistic. Thus one can accept 
that we could nowhere point to an assertion not linguistically clothed. 
But this does not mean that the asserting and the linguistic clothing are 
one and the same. For both in the case of speaking proper and in th 
case of inner, silent speech we have acts of asserting. 
The speaking is characterised quite differently in the two cases - but 
we shall of course guard against the temptation to characterise this dif* 
ference by viewing inner speech as a mere presentation of speech, for 
the presentation of uttered speech and inner speaking are clearly tw 
quite different things. But while the form of speech is thus altered in a 
quite specific fashion, the assertion to which it gives expression in th 
two cases remains one and the same. And in whatever way this altera .. 
tion may be more precisely characterised, the specific moment of assert· 
ing is certainly not subject to it , and this is sufficient proof of how mis-
taken we would be if we were to identify asserting with speaking. 
Now this assertion too, which is gradually beginning to come into 
prominence before us, can also be designated as a judgment in a second 
use of this term - perhaps an even more appropriate use than in our 
first use of 'judgment' as conviction or belief. Thus we have arrived at 
two concepts of judgment both of which are concealed within the ambi .. 
guous term 'acceptance' : indeed besides acceptance as esteem and ac-
ceptance as consent we have two separate cases of judging acceptance. 
And whilst linguistic usage seems at bottom to allow us to designate 
only assertion and not conviction as an accepting, since assertion and 
conviction are continually being confused, the latter is to that extent 
also included under this term. Brentano's theory of judgment gives us 
an example of this. He speaks of the judgment as an acceptance and this 
initially points us - when we leave out of account those meanings which 
do not belong at all to the sphere of the theory of judgment - to the 
sphere of assertion. But Brentano speaks on the other hand of differ-
ences of degree of a judgment and, as is not difficult to see, this leads us 
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immediately into a quite different sphere. In his Psychologie Brentano 
even spoke of 'intensities' of judgments in analogy with the intensity of 
feelings (1874, p. 292). 
This view he later somewhat modified. "It is false ... ", he tells us 
(1889, p. 57) "that the so-called degree of conviction is a grade of in-
tensity of the judgment which could be brought into analogy with the 
intensity of joy and pain." But Brentano wants to accept degrees of 
judgment just as much as before. And Windelband similarly speaks of a 
possibility of gradations in the 'feeling of conviction' or of 'certainty' 
(1884, p. 186). When applied to assertion such a claim yields no sense 
at all. Either something is asserted or it is not asserted; degrees of asser-
tion simply do not exist. Certainly one can speak of a hesitant or reluc-
tant assertion; but it is clear that such an assertion is not thereby some-
how an inferior assertion, somehow less of an assertion. The situation is 
quite different in the case of conviction. Here there is indeed a good 
sense to talk of levels or degrees. Alongside conviction there lie conjec-
ture and doubt and with each of these the 'degree of certainty' sinks lo-
wer and lower. Thus in this context Brentano cannot have in mind the 
judgment in the sense of an assertion, he must rather be thinking of 
judgment in the sense of conviction; and an expression to this effect 
forces itself upon Brentano in the passage indicated above. Here the 
dangerous ambiguity in the concept of acceptance shows itself extreme-
ly clearly, and hence we wish to avoid this terminology completely in 
what follows, where for cases of positive judgments we shall always use 
the term 'assertion'. Note, however, that we have managed to bring out 
a first fundamental distinction between conviction and assertion, a dis-
tinction which we wish to pursue somewhat further in what follows. 
In psychological and logical reflections we often find the act of judg-
ment placed alongside other more or less closely related acts of con-
sciousness. Sometimes we find judgment placed in opposition to doubt 
and conjecture, at other times in opposition to questioning or wishing. 
If we look more closely then we see that the term 'judgment' is here 
figuring in the two senses at present under review. It is unacceptable to 
rank conjecture and doubt with assertion; they belong rather alongside 
conviction, as different grades of certainty. On the other hand the acts 
which find their expression in the words 'Is a P?' or 'If only a were PI' 
undoubtedly find their place not alongside conviction but rather along-
side assertion. 
Thus far we have only indirect indications of the differences between 
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our two types of judgment. Direct corroboration here, as in other cases. 
can be achieved only through immediate perception. But we can aJ~ 
ready see with indubitable clarity that conviction or belief on the on 
hand, that which develops in us in the presence of a particular object . 
always involves some aspects which we may designate if not as feelings. 
at least as states of consciousness, at all events some condition of cons-
ciousness; but that assertion on the other hand, which does not 'deve-
lop' within us but is rather 'made' by us, is totally different from any 
feeling, from every condition, and is much rather to be characterised al 
a spontaneous act. 
Further both conviction and assertion realise themselves within time; 
one can determine the point of time in which they come into being. But 
whilst we can speak of convictions of any arbitrary temporal extent, as" 
sertion essentially excludes any talk of a temporal extendedness; it ha 
no temporal course, but rather exists as though it were somethingpunc .. . 
tual. 
We are far from affirming an absolute unrelatedness between convic-
tion and assertion; indeed it is precisely because there exist very close 
relations between the two that they have been continually confused. No .. 
assertion is possible which is not accompanied by an underlying convic .. 
tion which is such that both the assertion and the belief relate to some- . 
thing strictly identical. In contrast it is not necessary that every convi 
tion or belief founds an assertion, and it is even excluded that an asser .. 
tion should underlie a conviction. One may wish to question our first 
proposition by pointing to the case of lying, which seems to be some-
thing which is essentially an assertion in the absence of conviction. Clo-
ser consideration shows however that one may not at all speak of lyinl 
as a case of genuine assertion. We have to deal rather with a quite pecu-
liar modification of assertion, a quasi-assertion as it were, lacking pro-
per vivacity, and something for which we may find an analogy in tho 
quasi-questioning which is a frequent occurrence in conventional con" 
versation. Genuine questioning as much rules out a prior belief in that 
which is being questioned as genuine assertion excludes the disbelief in 
that which is being asserted. A conventional 'question', one with re .. 
spect to which we know perfectly well what is being asked about, is not 
a genuine question; and a lie, something which involves a disbelief in 
that which one purports to assert, is correspondingly not a genuine as· 
sertion. We cannot go further into this not in itself unimportant corres .. 
pondence between the two cases. For us they have merely the function 
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of bringing clearly into light the separation of conviction and assertion. 
Essential connections of the kind observed are clearly possible, and un-
derstandable, only where we have to deal not with some one thing that 
is merely expressed in different ways, but rather with two quite distinct 
formations. We wish to pursue the difference between the two a little 
further. 
§ 3 Acts of Presentation and Acts of Meaning 
It is well known that Brentano separated presentation and judgment 
from each other with extreme strictness, but that he at the same time 
brought them into close relation by postulating that of necessity every 
judgment have a foundation in a presentation. Every acceptance and 
every rejection necessarily pressuppose, he claimed, the presentation of 
that which is accepted or rejected. Thus the object which is judged is 
taken up twice into consciousness: once as something presented, once 
as something accepted or rejected. If now we, for our part, ask after the 
relation between presentation and judgment, then we must of course 
distinguish two separate sub-questions; and what holds of judgment in 
the sense of conviction or belief need not at all hold of judgment as as-
sertion. One thing certainly holds equally of both cases: there is no pos-
sible conviction and no possible assertion which is not conviction or as-
sertion of something; the relatedness to something objectual, with re-
spect to which the conviction is held, and towards which the assertion is 
directed, is something which is essential to both cases. We could, in this 
context, speak of the intentional character of the two types of judg-
ment, but we would then have to guard against drawing over-hasty con-
clusions from this 'intentionality' . 
To say of an experience that it is intentional is to say that it possesses 
a 'directedness towards' something objectual, and this in turn presup-
poses that something is 'at hand' for consciousness. But this being at 
hand - in the widest possible sense - is not a being presented, or at least 
need not involve any being presented.5 Certainly it is not easy to delin-
eate firmly the concept of presentation. Husserl has shown the many 
ambiguities by which it has come to be affected (1900/01, II, 
pp.493ff). 
Leaving out of account here the popular meaning in terms of which 
one speaks of presentation6 as something opposed to perception, we 
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can speak of presentation as something which includes equally not only 
perception but also memory, phantasy, and other related acts. A close 
examination of the expression 'presentation' [, Vor-Stellung' literally: 
setting before] will help us to circumscribe this very wide class of acts. It 
reveals that what is to be counted as an object of presentation is any-
thing which we have 'before' us, or which - since we wish to avoid any 
suggestion of a spatial conception - is 'present' to us, 'there' for us. The 
sheet of paper which I am now perceiving is present to me, as is Milan 
Cathedral which I am now bringing to mind, as is a past experience of 
grief which I am now remembering, and a landscape which I am now 
imagining. However fundamentally different all these acts may be, still 
everything which is grasped within them is 'there' for me, stands as it 
were in front of me, is 'set before me' in the pregnant sense indicated 
above. 
This concept of presentation extends itself far beyond the sphere of .. 
sensible objects in which it has its root. Even the beauty of a work of 
art, as something of which I am aware, is present to me, as is, say, the 
number 2, something which I bring to mind in relation to two arbitrary 
individual objects. Thus we by no means fail to appreciate the richness . 
of phenomena which are to be distinguished here. If we take sensible 
perception alone then it is immediately clear that that which is 'actually' 
perceived, that which stands in the foreground of our perceptions, is 
something quite different from the co-presented background, and that 
both are in their turn different from the small segment toward which my 
attention is, at any given moment, principally directed. In each of these . 
cases however, we can speak of an existence7 of the object of the act, as 
we can also in the various other spheres of bringing to mind, remember-
ing, imagining, being aware of, and (as e.g. in the case of numbers) 
thinking of. The objects of acts of each of these types are all there for 
me, and this is what allows us to consider all such acts, together with aU 
other acts whose intentional correlates are present in the same sense, as 
belonging together within a single group. One might now wish to ques-
tion whether all acts whatsoever which involve a relation to something 
objectual are not admitted by this account, and whether every intended 
object whatsoever is not thereby also something which is 'there' for me. 
This would be quite wrong however, as we shall now show by demarcat-
ing a class of intending acts whose objectual correlate is in no sense 
presented (set before the subject of the act), in the hope that we may 
thereby throw some further light upon the exposition thus far. 
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We shall tum our attention to linguistic expressions. Suppose I am 
counting off, say, the mountains of Germany, either by calling out their 
names to someone else or by reciting them to myself. In doing this I ut-
ter a large number of names, perhaps very quickly one after another, 
but obviously there is much more involved here than mere utterances; 
in uttering the words I mean something by them, i.e. precisely the 
mountains which they designate. Anyone wholly ignorant of language 
would be limited to the utterance of the words without understanding 
of them; that is without meaning by the words the objects correlated 
with them. In contrast, whoever utters the words understandingly 
thereby aims - with them or through them - through and onto some-
thing other, and it is this 'something other' which is all-important. The 
acts now under consideration have a spontaneous directedness to 
something objectual; but it is not difficult for an unprejudiced observer to 
perceive that there can be no talk of a 'presentation', of a 'presence' of 
these objects in the sense determined above. Certainly they may be 
present; I can call out the name of a mountain and at the same time 
perceive it or bring it to mind in my memory. It is then of course pre-
sented, but one sees immediately that this accompanying presentation 
is normally not to hand, or at least need not be to hand. And further 
one sees that even in the cases where the object signified by the name is 
presented we would still have to distinguish from this act of presenta-
tion the act of meaning which is tied up with the utterance of the words. 
For c:ven here it is not as if there were nothing more involved than a 
presentation of the mountain and the bare utterance of a word. A care-
ful consideration reveals much more that the following is the case: that 
presentation is an act of its own peculiar type, a bare receptive 'having' 
of the object which may be of a longer or a shorter duration. If now an 
utterance of the name of the object is adjoined to it then - should the 
name be uttered with understanding - there becomes bound up with 
that act of presentation another quite peculiar act, which we designate 
as an act of meaning or of being directed towards. This latter act, that is 
to say, appears alongside the presentation, distinguishing itself already 
from the act of presenting, on the one hand in being always linguisti-
cally clothed, and on the other hand in being such that a sponaneity of 
directedness and a temporal punctuality are essential to it. Presentation 
and meaning [here always in the sense of 'Meinen', i.e. meaning or in-
tending something objectual by a given expression - Tr.J are certainly 
not without any relation to each other in our example. It is of course 
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precisely the same object which is at one and the same time presented 
and meant. But this identity of reference-point of the two acts cannot 
sanction the identification of the acts themselves, i.e. by allowing the 
dissolution of the punctual act of meaning within the stretched-out act 
of presentation, the former conceived as somehow insignificant in the 
presence of the latter. Much more is it the case that the two exist 
alongside each other, such that, according to circumstances, one would 
designate the whole situation either as one in which the object, at first 
merely presented, is then grasped in an act of meaning, or as one in 
which an at first merely meant object is then further brought to given-
ness in an act of presentation. 
We do not fail to recognise the concomitant dangers of misunder· 
standing in designating the particular act which we are at the moment 
trying to throw: into relief as an act of meaning. For 'to mean an object' . 
'to aim at an object', can signify also an involved 'turning towards' the 
object - or whatever other expression may be offered for an interested 
concern, 8 - something which naturally falls outside our present field of 
investigations. For the kind of meaning or intending which involves an 
interested concern essentially presupposes the presence of the object 
which is 'meant' in this fashion, and here we are concerned with that 
type of meaning an object whose distinguishing peculiarity is precisely 
this: that it neither presents the object to us, nor in any way presuppo .. 
ses its being presented. And no other mode of expression is open to us, 
besides that of 'meaning' or 'intending' or 'being directed towards an 
object', for that type of act which is bound up with the understanding 
utterance of words and in which we are related to something objectual 
which is yet not brought to presentation. Hence there is nothing for it 
but to warn of the dangers of confusion due to ambiguity in this manner 
of expression, especially ambiguities involving the notion of an involved 
'turning towards', a notion which must quite deliberately be kept to one 
side. 
At the same time these considerations may serve to bring to light one 
principal difference between our concepts of meaning and presentation. 
Anything that is presented is such that we can turn toward it with a spe-
cific interest, raise it up out of its surroundings, concern ourselves with 
its specific traits. In the sphere of meaning in our sense however there i 
no possibility of such modifications. Consider for example the situation 
in which in the course of speaking we direct ourselves, in succession, 
towards a series of objects. In such a case there can be no talk of a turn-
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ing towards the objects, a raising of them into prominence. For of 
course whilst it is possible to turn one's attention towards objects which 
are at first merely meant, this can never occur within the act of meaning 
itself; it requires its own new act, one which will bring these meant ob-
jects to presentation, and only what is thus brought to presentation can 
then be the subject of an attentive turning towards. We can only advert 
attentively to that which is thus presented. 
We get even closer to the root of the fundamental opposition bet-
ween presenting and meaning through the following reflections. The 
acts in which objects are brought to presentation are quite different ac-
cording to the class of objects toward which they are directed. Colours 
are seen , sounds heard, things of the external world are perceived by the 
senses , numbers are thought , values are felt, etc. Thus even in the case 
of tones and colours it is an obvious requirement that we everywhere 
strictly distinguish the object of the act from the act itself, through 
which it is brought to presentation. Once given this distinction we re-
cognise that there exists an abundance of the most interesting essential 
connections which correlate of necessity the various types of object 
with corresponding types of presenting acts. Colours can after all only 
be seen, numbers only thought. One sees immediately that a quite dif-
ferent situation obtains for the case of acts of meaning an object. We 
speak understandingly of colours, tones, values, numbers, physical 
things, for all of these objects are meant, but here there are no qualita-
tive differences on the side of the acts of meaning which would corre-
spond to the qualitative differences among the objects. Certainly the 
act of meaning a colour is different from the act of meaning a number, 
precisely in virtue of the fact that in the one case it is a colour, in the 
other a number, which is meant; but it is an act of meaning, still, which 
lies before us in the two cases: there is no fundamental difference be-
tween the acts which would parallel the difference between seeing and 
thinking which we meet in the case of presentations of colours and 
numbers. 
§ 4 The Independence of Meaning and Intuition 
At first one may want to identify this difference with that between acts 
which are intuition ally filled and acts which are intuitionally empty, an 
opposition much discussed in the most recent logic and psychology, 
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especially in connection with Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is act. 
which lack any intuition - one would then argue - which are distin-
guished by us here as acts of meaning. Such a view would however be 
wholly wrong; indeed we have to deal here with two completely sepa-
rate pairs of opposites. For in fact we have both intuitional fulfilment 
and intuitional emptiness as much in cases of presentation as in cases of 
acts of meaning an object. A presentation which lacks intuition is by no 
means thereby turned into an act of meaning, and nor, conversely, is an 
act of meaning which is enlivened by intuition at all to be conceived as a 
presen ta tion. 
To make this clear we need only bring into view the various possible 
cases which may arise. If we restrict ourselves to the case of sensual 
presentation, then it is the perception of physical things which provide 
the best examples of presentations whose intuitional content may exhi-
bit a greater or lesser degree of fullness, distinctness and clarity. As we 
draw nearer to a physical thing the intuitional content which represents 
it becomes ever richer and clearer, new aspects of the object offer 
themselves to us with an ever greater distinctness. From the very begin-
ning the object stands before us ; to the extent that it is brought to pre-
sentation our intuitions take on ever new forms; and this increase or 
decrease of intuition takes place along various different gradational 
axes, even though the characteristic of being presented as such does not 
itself admit of degrees. Here we see quite clearly how the concept of 
presentation, characterised by the presence of something objectual, has 
to be precisely differentiated from the concept of intuition, as somew 
thing which may vary greatly in the continued presence of one and the 
same object. The independence of the two goes so far that something 
objectual may be presented without its being possible to establish the 
slightest trace of intuition directly representing that object. For consi-
der again the case of sensual perception. A book lies before me; the 
whole book is presented to me, and yet only parts of it are intuition ally 
represented. The rear side of the book, for example, is in no way intui-
tionally given to me: I neither perceive it, nor, under normal circum-
stances, do I attempt to draw any intuitional representation of it from 
memory or phantasy. Perhaps one would wish to say in regard to this si-
tuation that only the intuition ally represented part of the book is in fact 
brought to presentation. But what is to be found before me is after all 
the book , the whole object and not an object-torso. If we discover of a 
presented object, say a vessel, that its rear side is missing, then we expe-
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rience frustration. The intention, which had directed itself toward a 
whole object, is partially unfulfilled - and such a non-fulfillment, or 
better, such a frustration, is only possible if the original presentation 
were such that its intention had extended to the original object qua 
complete whole Le. including a non-intuitionally given rear side, such 
that with the rotation of the object there can arise a conflict between 
that which had at first been non-intuitionally presented and that which 
is now intuitionally given. Within each and every perception of a physi-
cal thing we find that there are components of the presentation which 
are non-intuitive in this way. Now certainly it would be possible, accor-
ding to one linguistic usage mentioned above, to designate the corres-
ponding objectual components as co-'meant'. But we surely no longer 
need to emphasis the fact that we are not dealing here with an act of 
meaning in the sense before us in the present paper: for what is essen-
tial to the latter is, of course, the non-presentedness of the object which 
is meant. We could imagine a case in which acts of 'meaning' in both 
senses were simultaneously to hand. Thus we might observe a physical 
object whose rear side is co-'meant' in a non-intuititive presentation 
and at the same time utter understandingly the sentence: 'The rear side 
of this object is ... ' Here there appears alongside the enduring non-in-
tuitive presentation a quite different type of act of meaning or intend-
ing, one which is linguistically clothed, temporally punctual, self-con-
tained. No one could deny the essential differences between these two 
acts; thus we se~ most distinctly that a non-intuitive presentation is in 
no way identical with the type of linguistically carried meaning-of-an-
object which concerns us here. 
It is not an easy task to uncover a wholly non-intuitional intention 
within the sphere of presentation; in the sphere of meaning, in contrast, 
it is non-intuitional acts which are the first to urge themselves upon us. 
In the flow of speech we talk at will of entities of arbitrary complexity. 
Meaning-act is followed by meaning-act in the most rapid succession; 
and we direct ourselves toward each and everyone of the entities 
designated by our words, though we can normally, in an unprejudiced 
observation, perceive nothing of an intuitive character in this directed-
ness towards (or meaning of) the entities involved.9 Certainly there are 
from time to time various types of intuitive image which rise to the sur-
face in the course of speaking; vague, indeterminate impressions, either 
of the objects of which we are speaking, or else of other, associated ob-
jects, sometimes heeded, mostly however and in the normal case, escap-
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ing our attention. They rise to the surface and in many cases outlive 
the act of meaning which they accompany, and then they once more dis-
appear. They appear to have only an insignificant influence upon the 
steady succession of acts of meaning, like ripples upon the surface of a 
river. Now one may designate those acts of meaning which are accom-
panied in this fashion by 'illustrative' images as intuitive acts, but then 
one must not overlook the fact that we have to deal here with intuitive-
ness in a quite different sense from that which arises in cases of pre-
sentation. 
What immediately forces itself upon us concerning the intuition 
which we encounter in amongst acts of meaning, is that this is intuition 
whose function is fundamentally different from that of the intuitiveness 
of perception, (and of presenting acts in general). In every presentation 
the intuitional content represents the presented object to me, it exhibits 
it to me. In that which is intuitionally given to me in a sensual percep-
tion the whole object stands before me, just as the remembered or 
phantasied object is grasped 'in' the intuitional content which is mo-
mentarily to hand in an act of memory or phantasy. Now whatever may 
be the results of a closer analysis of this very difficult matter, we can see 
already that in the sphere of acts of meaning we have to deal with a 
quite different situation. When intuitional schemata rise up and fall 
away here they lack any kind of representing function. They do not 'exw 
hibit' or 'present' anything [Sie stellen nichts 'dar' oder 'vor' ] - for of 
course in the sphere of meaning there is absolutely nothing to hand 
which is presented. Rather, they partake of an existence which floats 
quite free from that of the object which is meant. They belong to a quite 
different stratum to that of the intuitional content of presentation, not 
being truly immanent to [the sphere of J meaning. Where we can speak 
of an intuitiveness of presentation it is more apt, in a case of meaning. 
to speak not of its intuitiveness but rather of intuitive images [Bildern ] 
which accompany it. 
§ 5 Judgment and Presentation (Critique of Brentano) 
Our analyses have sufficiently demonstrated the absolute difference 
between presentation and meaning. In particular they have made clear 
that the non-intuitive presentation of an object is in no way identical 
with an act of meaning that object and that the meaning which is ac .. 
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companied by intuitive images is in no way identical with a presenta-
tion. The many recent discussions of the question whether there exist 
acts of consciousness which are absolutely free of intuition have over-
looked the fact that we have to deal here with at least two questions: 
with the question concerning intuition-free presentations and that con-
cerning intuition-free acts of meaning. It seems to us to be indubitable 
that there are intuition-free acts of meaning. It is, on the other hand, 
very questionable whether there exist absolutely intuition-free pre-
sentations. It is true that, as already mentioned, the rear side of every 
perceivable thing is non-intuitively presented; but then we do not have 
a self-contained, independent presentation: much more is it the case 
that the rear side is co-presented in the presentation of the object as a 
whole. Let it suffice here to point out that the variety of different opin-
ions in regard to the above question may perhaps be laid at the door of 
an inadequate separation of the two spheres of presentation and mean-
mg. 
We now return to the question whether every judgment is necessarily 
founded in a presentation. For the case of assertion this question may 
immediately be given a negative answer. One need only observe how, 
in the course of speech, assertion may follow on assertion without that 
which is asserted ever once needing to be brought to presentation. Here 
one must not allow oneself to be led astray by the apparently self-evi-
dent thesis that I can only judge about that which I know, and which is, 
therefore, somehow present to me. For although it is certainly correct 
that I must be related in some determinate way to that about which I 
make assertions in order to be able to make those assertions, it is wrong 
to suppose that it is only presentation in our sense which can be consid-
ered as providing this relation. I am related to objects also in cases of 
acts of meaning, acts outside the sphere of presentation. Indeed an act 
of this kind constitutes the necessary foundation for every act of asser-
tion. Further, in the act of assertion as such that which is asserted is not 
presented, not brought before the mind of the subject involved, even 
though in every case it would be possible for a presenting act to join up 
with or follow upon the act of assertion. This is not the place to draw 
the consequences for the theory of knowledge which follow from this 
fact. For us it is important only to remark that the meaning act can be 
qualified in a variety of ways. If I say, e.g.: 'Is a P?' and then: 'a is P' , 
then in both cases something is meant, indeed what is meant is identi-
cally the same state of affairs; but in the first case it is put into question, 
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in the second case assertingly posited. We could distinguish, within the 
total complex which we designate as the assertion of a state of affairs, 
the specific moment of assertion on the one hand from the constituent 
of meaning or intending on the other. The assertion is constituted from 
them both.10 The moment of assertion attains thrqugh the meaning-
component its relation to the relevant state of affairs; it is necessarily 
founded in this component. It is, in contrast, excluded that a conviction 
should be founded through such an act of meaning or intending. I can, 
of course, be convinced of a given state of affairs and at the same time 
mean that state of affairs. As just indicated this is always the case when 
a state of affairs is asserted; but then it is the assertion which is founded 
in the act of meaning and not the underlying conviction. 
The question now arises as to how conviction or belief acquires are· 
lation to its objectual correlate. Let us recall the case which served as 
our point of departure: I stand before a flower and I see its being red; 
on the basis of this act of seeing there develops in me the conviction of 
the relevant state of affairs. It is clear that in this case it is a presenta-
tion, in the exact sense determined above, which lies at the basis of the 
conviction. And thus one might be tempted to say, with Brentano, that 
the judgment is founded on a presentation. But there are two reasons 
for caution at this point: first of all we are not dealing here with judg-
ment in general but only with judgment in the sense of conviction; and 
secondly, whilst one could speak here of a judgment's possibly being 
founded in a presentation, one cannot affirm that such a foundation is 
necessary (and thus one cannot speak of judgment as having a presenta-
tional basis in Brentano's sense). For consider the case mentioned ear-
lier involving a turning away from a perceived state of affairs: clearly 
the latter no longer requires to be presented, in the strict sense, for the 
relevant conviction to endure. Of course that conviction is still 'refer-
red' to one and the same state of affairs, but this reference [Bezogen-
sein 1 is no longer something which is mediated through a presentation 
of the state of affairs. But nor, certainly, is it mediated by a meaning or 
intending of that state of affairs. For meaning in our sense is essentially 
bound up with linguistic expressions. There is, in fact, a whole series of 
possible intentions to what is objectual,l1 of which we wish here to con-
sider only two: acts of presentation, in which the object is 'there' for us, 
such that we 'have' it as our object and have it, in cases of absolutely 
complete intuitiveness, in closest proximity; and acts of meaning, in 
which we acquire a spontaneous directedness to the object which, how-
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ever, continues to stand at the remotest distance from us. Those acts 
which found convictions of the type which are not founded through a 
presentation - acts which as a whole we may perhaps best designate as 
acts of 'knowing about' - we leave to one side. This we can do all the 
more since we do not, in general, designate this kind of knowing as a 
judgment, but only the conviction which develops from the perception 
of a state of affairs. All that we have wished to show [against Brentano] 
is that a presentational foundation of such conviction is not necessary. 
With these remarks we have come to the end of our general discussions 
on the theory of judgment. We wish to hold on to the following as their 
result: that the term 'judgment' is to be understood in two senses, on 
the one hand as assertion, which relates to its objectual correlate in acts 
of meaning which mayor may not be accompanied by intuitions, and on 
the other hand as conviction or belief which develops out of more or less 
intuitive acts of presentation. This implies that we must speak also of 
the negative judgment in two senses, and thus already the problem of 
the negative judgment has been raised up onto a new level. 
II States of Affairs 
§ 6 Positive and Negative Position-Takings 
From those acts, such as acts of presentation and meaning, in which we 
lay hold of something objectual (either by having it as our object or by 
being directed towards it), we have to distinguish experiences which, as 
in the case of conviction or belief, involve our taking a position with 
respect to something. Other examples of the latter with which we are 
acquainted include striving after something, expecting something, and 
so on. There is an opposition running through this second class of acts -
but not through the first - between positivity and negativity. We not 
only strive positively after something but may also struggle against it. In 
both cases [of Streb en and Widerstreben ] we have a striving, but the two 
are, so to speak, of opposite sign.12 Now we find exactly the same in the 
case of conviction. So far we have naturally concentrated upon positive 
conviction; there is however, standing in opposition to this, a negative 
conviction, having a fully equal status. Let us suppose that someone as-
serts that a flower is red, and that in order to convince ourselves of this 
we go to the place where the flower is to be found, and see that it is yel-
low. Thus after we have approached the flower with the question as to 
whether it is truly red, there has developed within us a negative convic-
tion in relation to the corresponding state of affairs, a 'disbelief' in the 
flower's being red. Both positive and negative convictions may relate to 
one and the same state of affairs; if we search for expressions which 
would distinguish the two then we could say that the first is a bestowal 
of conviction [Oberzeugungszuwendung ], the second a privation of con-
viction [Oberzeugungsabwendung]. Both are however 'convinced' posi-
tion-takings. The moment of conviction is common to the two (just as 
the moment of striving is common to positive striving for and to striving 
against something). It is this moment which separates the two types of 
conviction from other intellectual position-takings, e.g. from conjecture 
or doubt. And it is this which allows us to designate them both as judg-
ments, the polar opposition just mentioned being that which brands the 
one as a positive the other as a negative judgment. 
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From the point of view of a description of their nature, positive and 
negative conviction are ranged alongside each other on an equal foot-
ing. But a certain difference between the two seems to appear when we 
take account of the psychological preconditions which must be met if 
either is to be acquired. If we simply look out at the world which sur-
rounds us we are confronted by a plenitude of states of affairs which we 
behold, and towards which our convictions are subsequently related. It 
is clear that only positive convictions could develop in this way. A nega-
tive conviction could never arise through a simple reading off of a state 
of affairs from without; such a conviction rather always presupposes 
that we approach an existing state of affairs with a prior intellectual po-
sition-taking relating to a second, conflicting state of affairs. The con-
flicting state of affairs may be, for example, believed, conjectured, 
doubted, or merely put into question, but as we behold the other state 
of affairs the original positive conviction or conjecture, doubt, uncer-
tainty or question becomes transmuted into or finds its answer in a neg-
ative conviction. Here we note a peculiarity of the negative judgment, 
to which we are not yet however in a position to do justice. 
Alongside the negative conviction of a state of affairs there is the po-
sitive conviction of a contradictory state. The belief that a is not P and 
the disbelief that a is P, stand, in regard to their logical content, as close 
to each other as possible. Nevertheless as judgments they are complete-
ly different and can by no means be allowed to be identified. Not only 
that which pertains to the side of consciousness13 but also the objectual 
side are fundamentally different in the two cases: the belief stands op-
posed to the disbelief, the being P of a to the being not P of a. Now dis-
belief relative to a given state of affairs is something which above all 
else deserves the name of a negative judgment. And further, since it has 
been quite usual in the traditional theory of judgment to call something 
a judgment not only in virtue of its specific character as a judgment but 
also in virtue of the specific nature of its objectual correlate, we shall 
also bring the positive conviction of negative states within the sphere of 
our investigations. The most intransigent difficulties were encountered, 
after aU, precisely in regard to the case of conviction of (belief in) 
something negative - which was not, of course, separated in the litera-
ture from the case of negative conviction of (disbelief in) something 
positive. And the treatment of these difficulties will reveal itself as ne-
cessary also for our own deliberations. They are difficulties which have 
their origin in the somewhat primitive conception according to which 
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the positive judgment is regarded somehow as a combining or a unify~ 
ing (a conception which, defensible or not, clearly acquires a quite dif-
ferent sense according to whether it refers to judgment as conviction or 
to judgment as assertion). According to this conception a true judg~ 
ment is one whose associated 'act of unifying' corresponds to a factually 
real unity in the objectual world. It is clear that any attempt to apply 
this conception analogously to the negative judgment will meet with 
difficulties. For we would have to conceive such a judgment as a separa-
tion, and then we should seek in vain for the real relation which would 
be reflected in this separating. What after all should it mean - as Win-
delband rightly asked (1884, p. 169) - to say that in the simple judg-
ment 'blue is not red' one was giving expression to a separation? And if 
precisely this example may tempt us to regard, say, the relation of being 
different as the real relation which is here in question, then reflecting 
upon a judgment such as 'certain functions are not differentiable' would 
immediately convince us of the futility of any such attempt. This is how 
negation as such came to be conceived as 'no real relation' but merely 
as a 'relation-form of consciousness' (Windelband, loco cit.). Negation 
thereby came to be regarded as something purely subjective; according 
to Sigwart and a series of other, more recent logicians it is an act of re· 
jecting. However whilst it can be admitted that in the case of negative 
conviction of a positive state of affairs the negativity belongs exclusively 
to the side of consciousness, every such attempt breaks down on those 
cases where a positive conviction is directed towards something nega· 
tive. The possibility of such cases is evident, and it is not the task of lo-
gic to re-interpret them as something which they are not, but rather to 
do justice to them as they are. 
§ 7 The Objectual Correlates of Judgments: Judgments and Relations 
Just as our treatment of the negative judgment had as its necessary pre-
supposition a clarification of the concept of judgment in general, so 
now we must investigate the nature of the objectual correlates of judg· 
ments in general before we can become clear about negative judg~ 
ment-correlates. And here too we shall be able to take these investiga-
tions only so far as it indispensable for our own particular aims. 
We already know that there exist essential connections between the 
subject-side of a judgment and that objectual something to which it is 
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related, connections of a type which imply that not every intentional act 
is appropriate to every arbitrary object, but rather that there exist on 
both sides relations of necessary co-ordination. Thus it is evidently im-
possible that an act of conviction should relate to a sound, a colour, a 
feeling, or a thing of the external world, just as it is impossible to assert 
a sound, or a thing, or what have you. Or, passing from the sphere of 
real objects to the sphere of ideal, i.e. extra-temporal objects, what 
should it mean to believe or to assert a number, or a concept, or some-
thing of that sort? In whichever sense we may want to understand the 
concept of judgment there are essential laws which exclude the possibi-
lity of a judgment ever relating to entities of this type, i.e. to entities of 
the type which we may quite reasonably designate as (real or ideal) ob-
jects. 
Brentano and his followers of course seem to adopt a different point 
of view in this matter. According to them any arbitrary objectual 
something can be judged, i.e. can be 'accepted' or 'rejected', a tree or a 
sound or what have you. And here we see how necessary were the con-
ceptual distinctions which we made at the beginning of these investiga-
tions. For so long as one is operating with such an ambiguous term as 
'acceptance' it is of course possible to make a case for its being applic-
able to all sorts of entities. There is indeed a sense of acceptance or ap-
proval which can involve a valuing or an assenting relation to objects: 
to actions or propositions, for example. But once we exclude all addi-
tional meanings, and concentrate only upon those which can truly claim 
genuinely to refer to judgments - i.e. either to convictions or to asser-
tions - then it becomes impossible to deny that these intentional func-
tions can never, of their very nature, relate to objects such as colours or 
things or experiences. This is why Brentano and his followers are, in 
this matter, somewhat isolated. 
Since Aristotle logic has been dominated by the view that it is rela-
tions between objects which are posited in judgments. And indeed, this 
view is very tempting: for if objects cannot be judged it seems that rela-
tions between objects are all that would remain to serve as the corre-
lates of judgments. However widespread this view, however, it can by 
no means hold its own against a closer analysis. And for this we do not 
even require any special investigation of relations - a short considera-
tion will provide us with all that we require. Let us take relations such 
as those of similarity or difference, or of right or left. Now certainly 
there are judgments in which such relations seem to be believed or, re-
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spectively, to be asserted: 'a is similar to b' or 'a is to be left of b'. At the 
same time however there is one type of judgment - and precisely the 
most common type - with regard to which we can find absolutely no 
such relation on the objectual side, namely judgments of the form 'a is 
P'. Take, for example, the judgment: 'the rose is red'. According to the 
traditional theory what is judged here is a relation between the rose and 
red; clearly however this is not at all the case. Of course there are such 
relations, and they can occur in judgments: 'the rose forms the sub· 
strate of the red'; 'the red is inherent in the rose'. Here we have the pe-
culiar converse relations of being a substrate of and inhering in, as de· 
fined for physical things. But these are certainly not posited in the 
judgment 'the rose is red ' . One must not let oneself be misled by the 
close mutual kinship of the three judgments involved. Certainly it is the 
same factual material [derselbe sachliche Tatbestand ] which lies at the 
basis of each, but they comprehend this factual material in quite differ-
ent ways and in quite different directions. That it is possible to make 
all three judgments in regard to the existence of the same underlying 
factual material lessens not at all the differences between them. Just as 
the judgments 'a is to the left of b' and 'b is to the right of a' are differ .. 
ent, even though it is perfectly identical factual material which under .. 
lies them both, so it is with the judgments 'the rose forms the substrat 
of the red', and 'the red inheres in the rose'. And both are in their 
turn different in their meaning, though not in their underlying factual 
material, from the judgment 'the rose is red'. Only in the first two case 
do we find relations on the objectual sides of the judgments concerned' 
considered without prejudice the third judgment displays nothing of a 
relation. 14 But how are we to understand more closely the nature of th 
objectual correlate of this judgment, the being red of the rose, put for .. 
ward as an example of the form being P of a? 
§ 8 States of Affairs as Objectual Correlates of Assertion and Belief 
It is already evident that we must sharply differentiate the being red of 
the rose from the red rose itself. Those statements which hold of the 
one do not at all hold of the other. The red rose stands in the garden, it 
can wither; the being-red of the rose does not stand in the garden, nor 
does it make sense to speak of its withering away. There is a strong in-
clination to regard this merely as semantic quibbling and to raise th 
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objection that peculiarities of language are here being confused with 
peculiarities of the things themselves. We are far from wishing to de-
fend such confusions where they do in fact occur. But one should be 
rather careful with objections of this kind: in particular they should not 
be raised until it has been ascertained what 'mere peculiarities of the 
use of language' really are. There are passages in Kant, for example, 
[which rest on constructions] which our linguistic usage would no longer 
permit. I S 
Let us suppose that someone infringes one or other rule of linguistic 
usage. Then one would at most object to him that he was expressing 
himself in a manner which was not customary, never could one object 
that that which he said was false, solely in virtue of its irregular expres-
sion, when it would otherwise be true, nor that it was true when it 
would otherwise be false. The meaning of the proposition involved is 
not affected at all by the mode of expression, i.e. what we have before 
us here is truly a 'mere difference of words'. The matter is quite differ-
ent however when we are comparing the two judgments 'the red rose 
stands in the garden' and 'the being red of the rose stands in the gar-
den'. Here it is not merely linguistic differences which we have before 
us. The first judgment is true, the second is false or even senseless. The 
being red of a rose cannot as such stand in the garden - just as, say, a 
mathematical formula cannot be sweet-smelling. This implies however 
that the being red of the rose, as much as the mathematical formula, is 
something which presents its own demands and prohibitions and is 
something of which judgments mayor may not hold. Does one really 
wish to apply here the notion of differences of linguistic usage? Does 
one really want to say that between the being red of the rose and the 
red rose itself there obtains a 'mere difference of words', that it is me-
rely linguistically irregular to say that the being red of the rose stands in 
the garden? Would it not be a remarkable kind of linguistic usage which 
admits expressions like 'the being red of the rose' whilst forbidding 
their occurrence as the subject of certain judgments? And how, most 
importantly, could the violation of linguistic usage turn an otherwise 
correct judgment into one which is false or even senseless? Finally, al-
though the present point requires no further argument, we can appeal 
to the fact that the proposition 'the red rose stands in the garden' is cor-
rect and the proposition 'the being red of the rose stands in the garden' 
is false, whether expressed in German, French or Chinese. This shows 
that the entities which serve as the subjects of the two otherwise identi-
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cal judgments must be different, in other words that the red rose is 
something different from the being red of the rose. 
Actually we have here nothing more than the corroboration of 
something which we have already established, namely, that since physi-
cal things can never be asserted or believed, and since, on the other 
hand, the being red of the rose functions as the objectual correlate of 
the judgment 'the rose is red', it follows that this correlate must be 
something other than the red rose itself, which is a thing in the external 
world. Henceforth we shall refer to such correlates as states of affairs. 
This term has been used thus far in our arguments quite without cere-
mony; it is indeed the term best suited to objectual formations of the 
form being P of a .16 Thus we have to distinguish between objects in the 
strict sense, whether these be real, (like physical things, tones, experi-
ences), or ideal, (like numbers or propositions, or concepts), and states of 
affairs , as entities of a quite different nature. So far we are acquainted 
with only one peculiarity of states, that they are, in opposition to ob-
jects, that which is believed or asserted in judgments. 17 We now wish to 
supplement this with a further set of determinations. 
§ 9 Further Characteristics of States of Affairs 
States of affairs stand in relations of ground and consequent 
The difference between the relation of ground and consequent and the 
relation of cause and effect has become part of the stock-in-trade of 
philosophy today. What must be noted however is that we have to deal 
here not only with a difference in the relations involved but also with a 
fundamental difference between the elements which stand in these rela-
tions. The movement of one ball causes the movement of another; here 
it is a physical event which serves as the cause of a second physical 
event. On the other hand physical things, events, processes and condi-
tions never appear in the relation of ground and consequent. Indeed 
one can assert quite generally that no object can ever serve as ground or 
consequent. It is impossible that a physical thing, say, or an experience. 
or a number, should entail anything or that anything should follow from 
them. It is at most the existence of a thing or of an experience which can 
function as a ground. But the existence of an object is clearly not itself 
an object, but rather a state of affairs. It is always and could only be 
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states of affairs which serve as ground and consequent. That something 
is the case [daft etwas so oder so sich (verhiilt' J is the ground for a second 
state of affairs which follows from it: from the state of affairs that all 
men are mortal there follows the mortality of the man Caius. 
Thus we arrive at a further determination of states of affairs, that 
they and only they stand in the relation of ground and consequent. 18 
Everything which we encounter, either in science or in everyday life, as 
a connectedness of ground and consequent, is a relation between states 
of affairs. This holds also of those relations which tend to be collected 
together under the name of laws of deduction: these are, properly con-
ceived, nothing other than general principles expressing relations be-
tween states of affairs. There are profound implications for the con-
struction of logic which develop out of this insight (see below, § 19, 
note 40); however in this connection our own interest will have to take 
another course. 
States of affairs may suffer modalities 
The various different types of laws of deduction which have been dis-
tinguished within traditional logic must, if they are to be conceived as 
relations between states of affairs, have their basis in differences be-
tween types of states of affairs. We wish to consider such differences in 
type from two standpoints. In the first place states of affairs can differ 
amongst themselves according to their modality. Beside the simple 
state which is the being P of a there is also a's being probably P, a's be-
ing possibly P, and so on. Here we cannot go further into the precise 
nature of these differences of modality. What is important for our pur-
poses is that it is once more states of affairs, and only states of affairs, 
which can adopt such modalities. 19 There is absolutely no way in which 
an object can be probable, such a predication relative to an object 
would have no sense, and wherever we find someone apparently speak-
ing of such a probability, say of the probability of a physical thing, then 
this is nothing more than an inadequate form of expression. In such ca-
ses one has in mind the probability of the existence of a thing or of cer-
tain physical occurrences, that is to say with nothing other than the 
probability of states of affairs. A probable tree or an improbable num-
ber are obviously impossible - and clearly not because we have to deal 
here specifically with trees or numbers, but rather because the object 
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form itself excludes such modalities, where the form of states of affairs 
quite generally and essentially admits them. 
States of affairs may be either positive or negative, subsistent or non-sub-
sistent 
Viewed from another side, states of affairs can be distinguished as posi-
tive and contradictory-negative. This too is an opposition which we 
could never encounter in the world of objects. Beside the being P of a 
there is a being non-P of a. The two states of affairs are contradictory in 
relation to each other, the subsistence of the one rules out the subsis-
tence of the other. There is, in contrast, no tone non-C by the side of 
the tone C, and no colour negative red alongside the colour red. One 
does speak, though, of negative position-takings. But positive and neg-
ative position-takings, love and hate, for example, whilst certainly op-
posed to each other, are nevertheless not mutually contradictory. Only 
when one and the same subject adopts opposite positions relative to 
one and the same thing can we speak of an inner inconsistency, of a 
'self-contradiction' of this subject. We would then be talking of a quite 
different type of contradiction, however. The relation which interests us 
here, between positive and negative as logical contradictories, is to be 
found only in the sphere of states of affairs. 20 
Positive and negative states of affairs are total1y co-ordinated to each 
other. If there exists somewhere a red rose then with the existence of 
this physical thing are given arbitrarily many positive and negative sta-
tes of affairs. The red rose exists, the rose is red, a specific instance of 
red inheres in the rose; the rose is not white, not yellow, etc. The red 
rose, this physical unit-complex [dieser dingliche Einheitskomplex 1 is the 
factual material which underlies each and every one of these states of 
affairs [ist der allen dies en Sachverhalten zugrunde liegende Tatbestand J. 
In the case of the rose we speak of existence, in the case of the states of 
affairs based upon the rose we do better to speak of subsistence.21 It 
must be noted that subsistence is by no means included as an essential 
moment within the concept of a state of affairs. Just as we can separate 
(real or ideal) objects from their (real or ideal) existence and recognise 
without further ado that certain objects, such as golden mountains and 
round squares, do not exist (or even, that they could not exist), so we 
separate also the state of affairs from its subsistence and speak of states, 
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like the being golden of mountains or the being round of squares which 
do not subsist or, again, which could not subsist. 22 In this respect there 
is a far-reaching analogy between objects and states; but we immedia-
tely notice also a fundamental difference between the two: that wher-
ever a state does not subsist there subsists of necessity the contradictory 
state which is opposed to it. For non-existent objects, in contrast, we 
have no correlated objectual existents. The relation of contradictory 
positives and negatives - with all the laws bound up with it - has its 
place exclusively in the sphere of states of affairs. 
§ 10 The Apprehension of States of Affairs: Judgment vs. Apprehen-
sion 
So far we have found that the following holds of states of affairs: that 
they are that which is believed and affirmed, which stand in the relation 
of ground and consequent, which possess modalities, and which stand in 
the relation of contradictory positivity and negativity. These determina-
tions are to this extent sufficient, that every entity to which they apply is 
of necessity a state of affairs. Clearly they do not strictly speaking con-
stitute a definition of states of affairs, but it seems questionable, for 
such most primitive objectual formations23 as states of affairs, things, 
processes, whether definitions are possible at all, and whether, if they 
were possible, we could achieve anything with their aid. The only thing 
which can be demanded of us in the context of our present problems is 
that we remove these formations from the realm of bare opinion and of 
inadequate imagery and that we bring ourselves as close to them as pos-
sible. 
This leads us to the question how exactly states of affairs are given to 
us. Clearly we encounter initially quite peculiar difficulties in this re-
gard. Take once again our example of the being red of the rose. I do 
say, after all- and everyone would agree with me in this - that I 'see' 
the being red of the rose, and by that I mean not, say, that I see the rose 
or its redness; I mean, rather, that I see something which is evidently 
different from the red rose, which we designate as the state of affairs. 
But there are certain misgivings which present themselves as soon as we 
attempt to convince ourselves of the rightness of this mode of speech. I 
see before me the rose, I see also the redness which is to be found inher-
ing in it. But it seems that this exhausts what it is that I see. No matter 
how much I strain my eyes it seems that I shall not in this fashion disco-
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ver a being red of the rose. (Cf. Husserl, 1900101, II, p. 416.) And still 
less can I see negative states of affairs, the being non-white of the rose, 
for example. And yet I mean something quite definite when I say, 'I see 
that the rose is red' or 'I see that it is not white'. This is not an empty 
mode of speech, but one resting on experiences in which such states are 
actually given to us. Admittedly they must be given to us in a different 
way from the way in which the rose and redness are given. And this is 
indeed the case. In seeing the rose I 'discern' its being red, this becomes 
'apprehended' by me. Objects are seen or looked at, states of affairs , in 
contrast, are discerned or apprehended. And one should not allow one-
self to be confused, either, by the mode of speech according to which 
objects too may be apprehended - as humans say, or as animals. We 
have here an equivocation whose roots are easily grasped. 'Apprehen-
sion' in the sense of conceptual laying-hold-of is something quite differ-
ent from apprehension in the sense of the discernment of states of af-
fairs. Note that in the just-mentioned cases of apprehension in the for~ 
mer sense the objects are clearly not brought to apprehension in our 
sense at all; at most it is their being human or their being animal which 
is apprehended or discerned. 
These reflections may be generalised immediately to apply to all 
judgments effected on the basis of sensual perceptions. That is, whether 
one is speaking of what is seeable, hearable or smellable the 
corresponding state of affairs will not itself be seen, heard or smelt but 
rather apprehended. But nor do we need to restrict ourselves to this 
group of judgments. Let us take an arbitrary judgment of another type, 
say '2 x 2 = 4'; here too we must distinguish the manner in which the 
objects which occur in the judgment - 2 and 4, in this case - are given, 
and the manner in which the whole state of affairs is given. Numbers 
are of course not sensually perceived, but it would yet be premature to 
deny them any perceptual or, to choose a more suitable expression, any 
intuitional mode of giveness. For even numbers can be presented to us. 
I can make clear to myself in relation to two arbitrary individual objects 
what the number 2 is; my gaze is then directed towards the object-pair 
in question, but my intention does not hold short with that; rather, I use 
it as the basis on which to bring the number 2 to intuitive givenness. 
Here we cannot go further in investigating these very important cases of 
intuitional presentation of ideal objects. Husserl has discussed them 
searchingly (1900/01, II, pp. 600ff); he designated them as cases of 'ca-
tegorial intuition', and just as the genuine apprehension of states must 
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be distinguished from sensual presentation, so too must it be distinguish-
ed from categorial presentation. It is, after all, immediately clear that 
the manner in which 2 and 4 are given to us is something quite different 
from the manner in which we apprehend the identity of 2 x 2 and 4. 
We apprehend the state of affairs; the numbers are intuited, could nev-
er of their nature become apprehended. We could say quite generally 
that the entities which are the elements of a state of affairs are percei-
ved, are seen, heard, or grasped categorially. And on the basis of these 
'presentations' the state of affairs itself is apprehended in a new and pe-
culiar act. The presentations which lie at the basis of the apprehension 
differ among themselves according to the type of entity involved. The 
acts of apprehending built upon them however do not sustain any dif-
ferentiation of this kind. 
Thus we have obtained a further determination of states: they and 
only they are apprehended in the particular sense discussed by us here. 
But this should not be taken to imply that a state may not be presented 
to us except where an act of apprehending is involved. On the contrary, 
we shall draw quite particular attention to the fact that there is such a 
thing as a bare bringing to mind of states of affairs which is accompa-
nied by no act of apprehension. I can bring to mind from memory the 
being red of the rose without needing to perceive the rose itself. Just as 
the apprehension of the state rested upon a genuine perception of the 
thing, so this bringing to mind of the state rests upon a mere bringing to 
mind of that same thing. But in the bringing to mind of the thing in itself 
we do not yet have the bringing to mind of the state of affairs. We have 
learned, after all, to separate rigidly things from states of affairs, and we 
know that to a given thing, as body of factual material [zu derselben 
Dingtatbestand], there belongs a plenitude of subsisting states. Thus on 
the basis of the bringing to mind of this same red rose I can bring to 
mind the being red of the rose, the being non-yellow of the rose, and so 
on.24 It is clear that we have before us once again what Husserl called 
categorial intuition, that is, an intuitional presentation which is not it-
self sensual but which in the end finds its foundation in a sensual intui-
tion. That the bringing to mind of a state of affairs is not an apprehen-
sion is immediately evident. Yet this bringing to mind nevertheless 
plays an important role in epistemology, since there our 'understand-
ing' of propositions and therewith, in many cases, the apprehension of 
states of affairs is frequently explained in terms of such bringing to 
mind. We cannot here pursue these connections any further; it is im-
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portant only that the act of apprehension be separated from all other 
acts in which we are related intentionally to states of affairs. 25 
Apprehension is not the bringing to mind of a state, but nor ob-
viously is it the assertion of a state. For it is essential to an act of appre-
hension that in it the correlate state of affairs is, in the fullest sense, 
there for us, where in an assertion it is in contrast merely meant. The 
characteristic difference between these two acts is too immediately ap-
parent for it to be necessary that we go more deeply into it here. What 
might perhaps loom near, however is a confusion of apprehension with 
conviction. For in conviction also, in so far as it comes into considera-
tion for us, the state in question is presented. However the absolute dif-
ference between the two is shown already by the just-mentioned consi-
derations. Let us suppose that I bring to mind the being red of a rose 
which I had apprehended at some earlier stage. I am convinced of it, 
precisely as before; here again we have the conviction of a state which 
has been brought to presentation, now however there is no apprehen-
sion which lies before us. But even in those cases where apprehension 
and conviction are present alongside each other the difference between 
the two is unmistakeable. I apprehend the being red of the rose; in this 
apprehension the state of affairs is presented to me, and on the basis of 
the apprehension there develops in me the conviction of, or belief in, 
that state of affairs. Conviction is, in this case, founded in apprehen-
sion; the former is the position which I take up, my receipt, so to speak) 
for that which apprehension offers to me. And we become clear con-
cerning other aspects of the kind of difference between the two when 
we note that the kind of gradations of certainty which lead from convic--
tion to doubt have no place at all with regard to apprehension, and 
further that apprehension, just like assertion (and in contrast to the 
condition of conviction or belief) is of a completely punctual nature. 
Assertion and conviction both carry the name 'judgment', and we 
now see that we must distinguish judgment and apprehension in the 
sharpest possible way. 26 Moreover we see that that conviction which 
develops in relation to a state of affairs which has been brought to pre-
sentation - which we earlier recognised as a type of judgment which i 
distinguished from convictions of other types - may be characterised 
more closely as a conviction which is founded in the apprehension of a 
state of affairs. The first determination of states of affairs which we at-
tained was that they are that which is believed and asserted, the final 
determination which we shall award them is that they are apprehended. 
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§ 11 States of Affairs and Relations 
In the dispute as to whether it is any arbitrary entities or whether it is 
only relations which may be judged, both parties are in the wrong. Both 
have ignored this third formation - the state of affairs - which is neither 
object nor relation, and which alone, for reasons of principle, can fur-
nish the intentional correlate of judgments. The question will now be 
raised as to how one is to deal with judgments such as 'a inheres in b' or 
'a is similar to b'. For even should we admit that there is no relation 
which is judged in judgments such as 'a is P', the situation seems to be 
quite different in these two cases. It is not difficult to lay such doubts to 
rest. The being similar of a and b is something that may be asserted, be-
lieved, apprehended, which can take on modalities, etc. It is certainly, 
therefore, a state of affairs. If one designates both it, and other states of 
affairs of the same form, as relations, then this is to be committed to the 
view that there are states of affairs which are relations and states of af-
fairs - like the being P of a - which are not relations. Accordingly some 
judgments are seen as having relations, others as having non-relations 
as their objectual correlates. But even in those case where judgments 
are correlated with relations this intentional correlation is mediated 
through these relations' being states of affairs, not through their being 
relations . 
There is of course more to be said on this. The term 'relation' is by no 
means unambiguous. Not only left and right, over and under go under 
this name, so also do being left, being over and under, etc. The two 
groups are however fundamentally different. Only members of the 
second group are states of affairs - though states of affairs, which are in 
need of completion; the former are related to corresponding states as 
the colour red is related to being red in colour. Neither red nor left and 
right can be negated or take on modalities, as can being red and being 
left or right. For certain relations, similarity and inherence, for examp-
le, this difference is concealed through the ambiguity in the terms 'simi-
larity' and 'inherence'. These terms may on the one hand mean the be-
ing similar and the being inherent (or inhering), and in using them in 
this way we would be speaking either of the assertion of or of the belief 
in the being similar of a and b. But they may, on the other hand, mean 
that through which the being in the state of affairs27 becomes determin-
ed as a being similar or as a being inherent. In this sense we speak of a 
having la certain} similarity with b. Just as we could transform the sen-
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tence 'a is red' into the new sentence 'a has redness' - where 'redness' 
here does not at all mean being red but signifies rather nothing more 
than the substantivisation of 'red' - so we can transform the sentence 'a 
is similar to b' into 'a has similarity with b' - and here too 'similarity' 
does not mean being similar (what, after all, should it mean to say that a 
has a being similar?)but signifies rather the simple substantivisation of 
'similar' . 
Thus we see that there are relations in two senses: according to the 
first sense, relations are at the same time states of affairs, and according 
to the second they are something quite different from states of affairs. 
Here we do not wish to come to a decision as to which of the two senses 
should more justifiably be bestowed upon this expression. 28 We wish 
only to draw the following consequence for our own arguments, that if 
we interpret 'relation' in the second sense, then relations could never be 
judged, for they would never be states of affairs. We could then divide 
states of affairs into two categories, those in which relations are con-
tained as objectual elements - as the being similar of a and b - and 
those for which this is not the case - as the being red of a rose. 
§ 12 On Impersonalia* 
It follows from the above that the assertion made by Ameseder that 
'every positive objective of so-being is a relation' (1904, p. 75) is in 
neither sense acceptable. But one must go one step further still. Not 
only are there 'objectives of so-being' (states of affairs of the form be-
ing P of a) which are not relations; there exist also states of affairs 
which instead of having two or three objectual elements have only a 
single element. For such states of affairs it is immediately apparent that 
we cannot speak of relations; at the same time they show that Mei-
nong's division of states of affairs into those of the form a exists and 
those of the form a is B (1910, p. 72) does not correspond to any ge-
nuine disjunction. We may take as examples the states being warm, be-
ing settled, and so on, which may in no way be reinterpreted as 'objec-
tives of so-being' (the being-warm of something or other). Such one-
* This section originally appeared in Reinach's Gesammelte Schriften (pp. 117-120) as 
an appendix to "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" . It has been inserted into the text 
at this point, along with the note to which it refers. 
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membered states can be believed and asserted. This is the way in which 
we obtain the judgments 'it is warm' and 'it is settled'. 
We may hereby attain a solution - at one stroke as it were - of the 
old and much-discussed problem of the nature of impersonal judg-
ments. I dip my hand into a basin and thereby acquire the conviction 
that the liquid therein is warm. We shall attempt to grasp this situation 
somewhat more precisely. I touch the liquid and at the same time per-
ceive its warmth. In touching the liquid or, better, in 'feeling though it' 
(at the same time grasping, in this penetration, that it is liquid) and in 
becoming aware of the warmth in it and of it, its being warm becomes 
evident to me, I apprehend this state of affairs. Liquidity and warmth 
are here sensually perceived, but not the state of affairs: the latter is not 
'penetrated' or sensed, but rather apprehended. Of course sensual per-
ception and the apprehension of states of affairs are not absolutely un-
related to each other. It is only a sensual perception which makes the 
apprehending possible, the latter isfounded in the former. In every case 
the apprehending is to be recognised as something completely specific; 
it is an act of a quite peculiar type, of which it is essential that it relate 
always and only to states of affairs [cf. § 10 above-Tr.]. In this respect it 
is similar to conviction or belief, with which however it must by no 
means be confused. In apprehending the state of affairs, in making it 
more or less evident to myself, there develops in me the conviction in it. 
But this conviction, as a position-taking, a condition which may endure 
for an arbitrary time, is sharply to be distinguished from the spontane-
ous, temporally punctual act of apprehending. The necessity of this di-
stinction becomes quite specially clear when we note that there may 
well be conviction in the absence of apprehending. The case of convic-
tion which develops simultaneously with an apprehending but then sur-
vives it can already demonstrate this to us. Above all however we are to 
reflect on those cases where no apprehending is present at all, as when 
we can bring to mind in memory a house in such a way as to acquire the 
conviction that it appeared thus and so without thereby being able to 
apprehend this state of affairs in memory. We do not wish to speak 
further of such cases of conviction in what follows, and by 'conviction' 
in the sense of judgment we shall understand only apprehending convic-
tion, that it to say, conviction which is founded in an apprehending act. 
It is now very clear that in the example just analysed we have to distin-
guish, on the object-side, the object and its property (i.e. the liquid and 
its warmth) and the state of affairs (the being warm of the liquid) and, 
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on the other side, the 'side of consciousness', the correlated sensual 
perception and the apprehending, and then further the conviction 
which is rooted in the latter. 
What it is to perceive warmth, this we know immediately when we 
bring to mind some example without our having to embark upon a close 
analysis of this kind of sensation. In our case the warmth is sensed as 
belonging to some object, the liquid. But now this is not a necessary 
condition. I go out of my house into the open; I can then perceive pure 
warmth - I perceive it in all exposed parts of my body. On the basis of 
this sensual perception I apprehend a state of affairs: the being warm, 
and I acquire the conviction of this state of affairs: the conviction that it 
is warm. We are far from wishing to deny that here too the warmth may 
appear as belonging to something other, to the air, for example, which 
is streaming against us. What is essential however is that this does not 
need to be the case. Let us think of a case where we have not the slight-
est awareness of the movement of the air about us, where we perceive, 
as we go out into the open, pure and isolated warmth. In such a case this 
is not bound up for us with any further object. It would be a fabrication 
of the worst kind if one wanted to assume that warmth must be bound 
up for us with the surrounding space or with the 'totality of existents' or 
even with 'chaos', which would then all of them have to be perceived at 
the same time. For what is sensually perceived is warmth, pure and 
simple; and what is apprehended, in consequence, is the being warm, 
and thus conviction also relates to this same state of affairs. That the 
being warm is a state of affairs stands beyond doubt after our earlier in-
vestigations. For it is clearly something which can stand in relations of 
ground and consequent, that possesses a negative counterpart to which 
it stands in contrary opposition, that can adopt modalities, etc. But it is 
at the same time a state of affairs which distinguishes itself in a charac-
teristic way from others, e.g. from the being warm of a liquid: for this 
state of affairs is through and through one-membered. We apprehend 
and become convinced of a precisely determined being thus and so, but 
one which is in no way the being thus and so of some ob ject (the air, or 
something similar), but rather it is a simple unattached so-being. 
Much more ought we to fear objections from an opposite direction. It 
is the warmth - so it might perhaps be argued - which, in our example is 
perceived; and thus also it is this alone which comes to be apprehended 
and believed. If I am convinced of the warmth then my judgment re-
lates to this condition, which we call warmth, and it is not at all clear 
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why we should now require the concept of a state of affairs here at all.29 
This objection threatens not only our conception of the individual 
examples at present under investigation but also the foundations of the 
theory of judgment earlier attained. For a spatially perceptible condi-
tion is certainly not a state of affairs. And if in this case conviction truly 
related to the condition, then we could no longer maintain the thesis 
that it lies in the essence of the judgment as such to relate to states of 
affairs. It is however necessary to proceed with great care at this point. 
The question arises whether the expression 'warmth' is wholly unambi-
guous, whether it truly designates the determinate condition in all its 
uses. Already, before we bring directly into view the phenomena in 
question, there are certain considerations which are suited to shake this 
belief. We speak of having pleasure in the warmth and of being pleased 
about the warmth, and this change of expression is not without signifi-
cance. It is distinct references of our feelings which are meant thereby. 
Pleasure 'in' something presupposes that that something in which I 
have pleasure is somehow present to me. I must sense the warmth, see a 
colour, hear a melody, or I must at least bring each of these intuitively 
to mind if I am to have pleasure in them. Concerning pleasure about 
something however the matter is quite different. Facts are related to 
me. I hear the words of he who is speaking and understand them. I can 
be pleased about that which he relates, even though it need not in any 
way be brought to mind by me. One thinks of conversations in which 
sentence rapidly follows sentence in complex cycles. I understand that 
which is communicated to me, and I can alternately be pleased or dis-
pleased about it. But that it should be intuitively present to me, that is 
neither necessary, nor, as a rule, is it in fact the case. This immediately 
takes us one step further forward however. That in which I have pleasure, 
and that about which I am pleased, the two being grasped in such 
different ways as the corresponding attitudes develop in me, are them-
selves completely different from each other. I take pleasure in the 
warmth, in the rose, i.e. in objects in the widest sense. I am pleased ab-
out this: that there are roses, that it has become warm; every pleasure 
about something -like every sadness, anger, etc. - necessarily relates to 
a state of affairs. Thus if we can speak, now, both of having pleasure in 
the warmth, and of being pleased about the warmth, this points to a 
double meaning of the expression in question. Indeed I do take plea-
sure in the warmth as an object when I let myself luxuriate in its wash-
ing about me on all sides. But when, in contrast, I am pleased about 
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the warmth, then this will in general mean that I am pleased about this : 
that it is warm (that is, about the state of affairs). Thus 'warmth' means 
both the condition and the state of affairs. Only thus can we understand 
how one could come to the erroneous conception that it is not a state of 
affairs which is judged in a sentence but a condition. 
That this is an erroneous conception is quite certain. Warmth in the 
sense of a condition can never be something which could be believed. 
This can best be made clear by reflecting on the fact that conviction that 
it is warm stands opposed to conviction that it is not warm as its contra-
dictory. Now if the first relates to a positive condition, the second must 
therefore relate to a condition which would contradict it. But what con-
dition could this be? The condition of coldness perhaps? But firstly 
warmth does not contradict coldness in the logical sense; and secondly 
it is not at all correct that the two judgments 'it is not warm' and 'it is 
cold' are equivalent to each other, much less that they are identical in 
meaning. The condition of warmth has no contradictorily opposite neg-
ative condition; only the state of affairs of being warm has the contra-
dictory opposite: not being warm. And similarly it makes no sense to 
posit, alongside the 'simple' condition, a condition having the modality 
of probability or of improbability attached to it; conditions do not ad-
mit of such modalities, which attach rather to states of affairs. Thus 
when we have, beside the judgment 'it is warm', also judgments such as 
'it is probably warm', etc., such judgments can be made understandable 
only as relating to states of affairs and not to conditions. All of this is an 
immediate consequence of our earlier discoveries. What is new is the 
insight that there indubitably exist one-membered states of affairs and 
convictions of such states of affairs. Of course the conviction of its being 
cold, light or dark, noisy or quiet, musty or clear, each of these has 
equal status with the conviction that it is warm. Each case is such that it 
is the warmth or coldness, the light or darkness, the quiet or loudness, 
the clarity or mustiness, as pure conditions, which are perceived, and 
that on the basis of this the corresponding state of affairs is apprehend-
ed and believed. These states of affairs are one-membered. Certainly in 
some cases there is a second member to which the sensed content is in 
itself attached, but this is not comprehended within the judgment and 
thus the conviction is in no way related to it; in other cases however 
there is no objective second member at all. Thus when I am convinced 
that it is dark, or that it is quiet, it is normally not possible at all to state 
what, in an individual case, is dark or quiet. 
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§ 13 Negative Conviction 
We have now acquired the means to answer our initial question. We 
started with the case of positive conviction directed towards something 
negative, pointing out the difficulties which have been encountered in 
regard to this case. These difficulties are unavoidable for the traditional 
conception, which allows relations to function as the intentional corre-
lates of judgments. This view could be maintained so long - though 
only in the sphere of positive judgment-correlates - because, on the 
one hand, many states of affairs could indeed be considered as rela-
tions, and on the other hand for those which remained (as, say, the be-
ing red of arose) transformation into a relation, whilst in fact incorrect, 
still seemed possible in the absence of a closer analysis. The matter is 
quite different in the negative case; here it is after all only too clear that 
with the being non-P of a no relation between a and P is judged. Thus it 
is quite understandable that sensible logicians endeavoured to transfer 
negation from the objectual side over to the side of consciousness. We 
have seen that this attempt broke down for the case of positive convic-
tion in something negative. It is now not difficult for us to recognise 
why this should have occurred. The negative something toward which 
the positive conviction or belief in the being non-P of a is related is of 
course neither an object nor a relation but rather a negative state of af-
fairs. Negative states of affairs subsist in precisely the same sense and 
with precisely the same objectivity as do positive states of affairs. A 
subjectivising re-interpretation is here neither necessary nor possible. 
Alongside the negative conviction or disbelief in a positive state of af-
fairs, now, there stands on an equal footing the positive conviction or 
belief in a negative state of affairs. And both can carry the name 'neg-
ative judgment', for a logic which systematically carried through the 
distinction between judgment and judged state of affairs could scarcely 
decline to classify judgments according to the characteristics of their 
correlated states of affairs. 
In the light of the discussions so far, negative conviction in positive 
states of affairs and positive conviction in negative states of affairs seem 
to be completely parallel to positive conviction in positive states of af-
fairs. If we turn our attention, however, to the precondictions under 
which negative judgments of these two kinds develop, then we discover 
certain important differences as compared with positive judgments. We 
have so far only hinted at the peculiarities which are involved; now 
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however we must throw a rather stronger light upon them. Positive 
states - as already pointed out above - can be 'read off, e.g. when, on the 
basis of the sensual perception of a physical thing, there arises simul-
taneously both the apprehension of and a belief in an appropriate state 
of affairs. Now a negative state of affairs could never be 'read off and a 
negative conviction could never arise in this fashion. 
To take first of all the case of negative conviction: as already pointed 
out above, this has as its psychological presupposition an intellectual 
position-taking relative to some state of affairs, S, a position-taking 
which may be one of positive conviction, of conjecture, of questioning, 
or what have you. Having taken up such a position we approach a state 
of affairs, S' , which is in conflict with S. As we apprehend S' and simul-
taneously grasp this conflict, S appears to us under a quite different 
aspect, an aspect for which we have, as yet, no adequate terminology 
and about which we can give, at this stage, no more than indications. 
The second apprehended state, S' , stands before us in such a way that it 
can be said to have an evidential character: in this apprehension the 
state of affairs is evident to us. 30 When, now, we grasp the conflict in 
which the first state stands with this second state, the former acquires 
that peculiar aspect which we might most reasonably designate as neg-
ative evidence. And it is only on the basis of this latter 'negative' evi-
dence that the relevant negative conviction or disbelief develops within us. 
Let us consider an example of this. In simply scanning the world 
around us we may clearly come to the positive conviction that some ob-
ject is red, but never to the negative conviction that it is yellow. The 
precondition of the latter is that the corresponding state of affairs has 
somehow been first brought into consideration, whether through our 
questioning, doubting, or in some other way. What, then, takes place 
when we move from such consideration of an initial state of affairs to a 
terminating conviction? We stand before the relevant factual material 
in the existing world and we apprehend that the object is red. With thi 
state of affairs positively evident to us we grasp that the state which is 
under consideration, the being yellow of the rose, stands in conflict with 
it, and thus this second state acquires that peculiar countenance which 
we have chosen to call negative evidence. Now only does there develop 
within us the disbelief in this state of affairs. 
Negative conviction therefore is subject to two preconditions: it must 
be preceded by an intellectual position-taking relative to the state of af-
fairs in question; and there must then occur an apprehension of a con-
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flicting state and a grasping of this conflict. The first of these conditions 
refers to the attitude which is the precondition for the occurrence of the 
judgment. Thus it is of specifically psychological interest. The second 
precondition is that which must be satisfied if negative conviction is to 
acquire certainty and justification. Thus it has a specifically epistemolo-
gical interest; we shall call it the fundament of the negative judgment. 
Let us now turn to the case of positive conviction of a negative state 
of affairs. This too is subject to quite specific preconditions, for if we 
were to limit ourselves to reading off those states which are given to us 
by the world of real and ideal objects then such a thing as a negative 
state would never be presented to us. And here also it is certain intel-
lectual position-takings which are presupposed. I must turn my interest 
to the negative state as such and, for example, put it into doubt or into 
question, if I am to be able to judge about it. That we come to such po-
sition-takings at all is quite understandable given the existence of neg-
ative conviction in positive states of affairs. For the present case is so 
closely related to the case of positive conviction of a negative state that 
psychologically the one can very well move in to take the place of the 
other. 
Much more important than this psychological precondition is the fact 
that here too there is a complex epistemological fundament which un-
derlies the conviction involved. Like the negative conviction of a posi-
tive state so also the positive conviction of a negative state presupposes 
the apprehension of another state. The conviction that 3 is not smaller 
than 2 can develop only on the basis of the apprehension that 3 is grea-
ter than 2. Here already however we can clearly discern the difference 
between this and the former case. For there it was necessary that a state 
be apprehended which stood in conflict with the judged positive state. 
Here in contrast the judged negative state - the being-not-smaller-than 
of the number 3 - stands with the apprehended state - the being greater 
than - in a relation of necessary connection of such a kind that the sub-
sistence of the one is directly bound up with the subsistence of the oth-
er. In consequence our present task is a quite different one from the 
above. For there the (positive) state to which the (negative) conviction 
was referred was negatively evident, in the sense that it stood in conflict 
with the other, positively evident state. Here the (negative) state to-
ward which the (positive) conviction is referred is positively evident, 
since of course it stands in a relation of necessary connection to the po-
sitively evident state. 
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Now of course there also exists negative conviction (i.e. disbelief) in 
negative state of affairs, i.e. a doubly negative judgment. The psycholo-
gical precondition here is an intellectual position-taking relative to the 
negative state which is in question. The epistemological fundament 
however, as in all of these cases, consists in the apprehension of a posi-
tive state which underlies the negative conviction which is involved. As 
in the first case so also here this underlying state must be such that the 
state which is judged stands in conflict with it, but here the conflict is a 
quite peculiar relation: the two states of affairs are contradictory to 
each other. 31 
Naturally we are not dealing here with empirical contingencies, but 
rather with a priori connections among essences. One such connection 
can be given the following provisional formulation: that every positive 
conviction of a positive or negative state of affairs presupposes - epi-
stemologically - the positive evidence of that state of affairs [i.e. pre-
supposes that it is apprehended with positive evidence). Every negative 
conviction of a positive or negative state of affairs presupposes the neg-
ative evidence of that state of affairs. The positive evidence of a neg-
ative state of affairs presupposes in turn the positive evidence of a posi-
tive state which is necessarily bound up with it. The negative evidence 
of a positive or negative state presupposes the positive evidence of a 
conflicting positive state - and in the case of the negative evidence of a 
state which is itself negative the two states are always contradictory to 
each other. 
Each of these not at all simple relations will require a stil1 more 
detailed investigation. 
OJ Negative States of Affairs and the Sphere of 
Assertion 
§ 14 The Character of the Assertive Sphere: Simple and Polemical 
Negative Judgments 
We have established above a distinction between conviction and asser-
tion. Conviction or belief develops on the basis of the apprehension of 
states of affairs. It outlives that apprehension, and it can endure even 
when the state in question is no longer current. If conviction passes 
away, then it leaves behind what is generally called inactual knowledge. 
On the other hand however a state of affairs of which we remain con-
vinced can become re-posited in an act of assertion. We have already 
seen that at the basis of every assertion there lies a conviction. This 
thesis can now be made more precise as follows. The conviction which 
underlies an assertion must in every case be positive; in no case can a 
negative conviction underlie an assertion. It belongs to the essence of 
assertion (assertive positing) that that which is asserted is believed; thus 
if there should develop in the sphere of conviction a disbelief then it 
must transmute into a belief in the contradictory state of affairs before 
an assertion can develop out of it. 
As in the case of conviction so also in the case of assertion it is states 
of affairs which can alone function as objectuaJ correlates, though in the 
case of apprehending conviction the states in question are presented,32 
where in assertion they are merely meant. And this is connected to an-
other important peculiarity of assertion. For in apprehending convic-
tion the state of affairs stands before me as it were in one blow, in its to-
tality; we have no sequence of successive acts of grasping [constituents 
of the state], but rather one single act, in which the state as a whole is 
taken hold of. Quite different is the case of assertion. If I say, positing-
ly: the rose is red, then there is here a series of acts in which the ele-
ments of the state of affairs are meant successively. The state is not 
meant in one blow - as it is in mind in one blow in the case of apprehend-
ing conviction. It is rather, built up in a series of acts, analogous to the 
way in which the elements of a melody constitute themselves in succes-
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sive experiences of hearing. Clearly these acts of meaning do not ap-
pear side by side unrelated to each other - as little as do the successive 
experiences of hearing the notes of a melody. Just as there the unity of 
the elements unifies the several experiences into the total hearing of the 
melody, so the unity of the elements of the state of affairs unifies the 
acts of meaning into a total meaning of the whole state. In the present 
case this total meaning is governed by the specific moment of assertion, 
but it may be governed in other cases by, for example, the moment of 
questioning. The state of affairs which stood before us in one blow in 
our apprehending conviction of it now acquires, in this assertive total 
meaning, a peculiar modification of its form, becoming articulated into 
the elements now successively constituting themselves. A series of cate-
gorial forms which are often referred to as 'merely grammatical' - al-
though they extend beyond the linguistic sphere into the region of logic 
- have their place here. A further development of this point would, 
however, lead us too far afield. 
As in the case of conviction, so also in the case of assertion we have 
to distinguish the positive and the negative judgment. Side by side with 
the judgment fa is P' we have also the judgment 'a is not P'. Traditional 
logical theory tends here to oppose rejection to acceptance, denial to 
assertion, negation to affirmation, or otherwise make appeal to some 
opposition of this sort. According to such theories it is one and the same 
state of affairs which is asserted or affirmed in the positive judgment 
and negated or denied in the negative, corresponding exactly to the way 
in which, in the other judgment-sphere, both positive and negative con-
viction (belief and disbelief) can relate to the same state of affairs. 
This view is however by no means as self-evident as it may at first 
sight seem. The following difficulty seems above all to have been over-
looked in this regard. Positive and negative conviction are both of them 
conviction, even though they are of opposite sign. This is what allows us 
to conceive both as judgments of a single type. But what is it which as-
sertion and denial (or affirmation and negation) have in common which 
makes both of them judgments? This is clearly a question which cannot 
be answered immediately, without further consideration. It is of course 
true from the descriptive point of view that even in the sphere of asser-
tion positive and negative judgments are closely related to each other. 
Indeed Lotze's attempt (1880, p. 61) to propose a tripartite division 
encompassing affirmation, negation, and questioning as standing equal-
ly, side by side with each other, breaks down precisely in virtue of this 
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intimate community of the positive and negative judgment, as com-
pared to acts of questioning. But it thereby becomes all the more urgent 
for the traditional conception that it give an account of what precisely 
this relationship is. However this problem may be solved, it cannot be 
avoided as a problem by the proponents of this conception. That it has 
not so far been solved need not imply any objection to the view in ques-
tion. We wish merely to point out that we have here exposed an impor-
tant difficulty for a view which had at first seemed so clear and self-evi-
dent. The only thing which can be decisive in cases such as this is to tum 
one's attention directly to the phenomena themselves; only thus can we 
discover once and for all whether denial is properly to be regarded as 
on an equal footing with assertion. 
First of all we must pose once more our familiar question, the ques-
tion as to whether the term 'negative judgment' has an unequivocal 
sense in the sphere of assertion at all. And just as we distinguished two 
types of negative judgment in the case of conviction, so we must now do 
the same here also, even though the distinction does not perhaps spring 
so immediately to the eye in this as in the former case. 
Let us consider the judgment, 'the king was not energetic' , as it oc-
curs in two different contexts. In the first context it is uttered by a histo-
rian who is expressing his opposition to the view that the king has been 
energetic. In the second context it occurs purely descriptively, in the 
course of a historical narrative. One must not overlook the quite differ-
ent aspects which are possessed by the judgment in these two cases: in 
the first case it has the aspect of opposition to the contradictory positive 
judgment, ('the king was not energetic'), in the second case that of 
simple portrayal, ('in this period the country flourished anew. The king 
was, be it said, not energetic, but ... '). One may wish to take no notice 
of such 'trivial' differences. This attitude we can very well accept, but 
only so long as it is admitted that they are differences. And given the 
evidence of the situation before us this is something which one cannot 
avoid: on the one hand we have a polemical taking up of a position 
against another judgment, on the other hand a simple positing. Now in 
the first of these cases the traditional conception, according to which 
the negative judgment is to be regarded as a denial or a rejection, has 
all the appearances on its side. In the second case, in contrast, an unpre-
judiced consideration would lead us much rather to speak of a positing 
or an asserting. In any event it has by now become clear that this whole 
question, far from being self-evident, demands a much closer investiga-
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tion. We begin with an analysis of that which is brought to expression in 
the word 'not', for it is of course this which outwardly differentiates the 
negative from the positive judgment. 
§ 15 Cognitive Functions: 'And', 'Hence' and 'Not' 
Already above we have spoken quite generally of 'words' and of the pe-
culiar meaning-acts directed towards objectual correlates which lie be-
fore us with the understanding utterance or words. Husserl speaks here 
of meaning-bestowing acts, acts which ensure that we do not stay tied to 
the mere word-sound as such, but rather that the latter acquires 'mean-
ing' [Bedeutung] for us. However well-founded is this notion of mean-
ing-bestowing act, and however important it is for the understanding of 
the fundamental concept of (ideal) meaning as such - of which we will 
here have nothing further to say - it must be emphasised that objectual 
meaning and meant objectual correlate cannot be assigned to every 
word. Words such as 'and', 'but', 'also', 'hence', 'not', and so on, are 
understood in the course of the understanding utterance of sentences 
without our being able to say that they are guided by acts of meaning 
objectual correlates - as are, say, the words 'Socrates' or 'tree'. It is in-
dubitable that when I utter one of these words understandingly in the 
context of a sentence there is something more than the utterance itself 
which is involved; but it is equally indubitable that this something more 
is not a direction towards something objectual in the sense earlier delin-
eated. For what could this objectual something be, which would cor-
respond to 'also' or 'but'? This makes all the more urgent the question 
as to what it really is which corresponds to such 'objectless' expressions. 
Here we wish to restrict our attention to 'and' and 'not'. 33 It is strictly 
speaking only the latter which is of interest to us, but calling in aid the 
other, more neutral example will be useful to our purposes. 
If I say 'a and bare C', then in regard to the subject-place I am 
directed to a and to b, but not however to any and. In spite of this, the 
directed ness towards a and b does not exhaust everything which is in-
volved here: a and b are not just meant, they are at the same time con-
nected together. It is this connection which corresponds to 'and'. The 
and-function, therefore, connects; it combines together. 34 And indeed 
it connects together always pair-wise. If someone wishes to combine a, 
b, c as in 'a and band care D' , - then two such connecting functions are 
required. Of course instead of this one could also say: 'a, band care D', 
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or even: 'a, b, care D', but the absence of the word 'and' does not imply 
that the corresponding function too is absent. It is indeed clear that in 
these cases also the and-function is doubly present. For a, b, c, are not 
meant without relation to each other; they are rather bound together in 
a 'connectional meaning act'. 
We must separate most strictly the connecting function which we as-
cribe to 'and', from that which is constituted for us in the connectional 
meaning-act, i.e. the 'totality' or 'whole' made up of a and b. These -
certainly highly ambiguous - terms should not be misunderstood. Ab-
ove all, the whole, a and b , which is constituted through the operation 
of the and-function, is not a spatial or temporal togetherness; it is not at 
all the kind of unity which would be characterised by any material rela-
tionship between its constituents, however remote. The most heteroge-
neous entities can clearly be 'bound together' by means of 'and'. And 
just as little should this connecting-function be confused with synthetic 
apperception through which entities brought to presentation are com-
bined into a unity. (See Lipps, 1906, p. 119). For the and-function is to 
be found in the sphere of meaning, in which, of course, entities are not 
brought to presentation at all. 
It is scarcely possible to determine more closely this connection: one 
can only issue the invitation to reflect upon it and convince oneself of its 
peculiar nature. It is not at all something which is brought to presenta-
tion in the understanding utterance of the sentence, just as little as are -
according to the results of our earlier investigations - the objects them-
selves. If I say: a and band c and dare E, then a series of connecting 
functions is involved, but the totality which thereby develops is not pre-
sented to me. And what holds for this whole of several objects holds 
also for a whole consiSting of only two. Of course I am at each stage free 
to bring this totality to presentation. And then I apprehend it securely 
as that which had been constituted through the connectional meaning-
act. Indeed without this possibility we could not speak of a constitution 
effected by means of the and-function at all. However, in the course of 
speech such a bringing to mind does not normally take place. 
Here we find an opposition skew to that which was distinguished ear-
lier between meaning and presenting. There corresponds to 'and' not 
the meaning of some object, but rather a function, in particular a con-
necting function. 35 This connecting has to be separated on principle 
from the presentation of that which becomes constituted in it. And thus 
beside the opposition of meaning and presenting one and the same ob-
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jectual something there now appears the quite different OpposItIOn 
between the execution of a function and the presentation of that which 
is constituted in this execution. Certainly there is such a thing as direc-
tion towards the function itself; indeed it is to precisely this that we ap-
peal when speaking of the function. And this in turn must be distin-
guished from the presentation of the function, as this occurs, e.g. when 
one attempts to make our current considerations understandable. It is 
on the other hand possible to direct oneself toward [to mean ] that which 
is constituted in the function, as when we speak of 'the totality a and b', 
and it is in turn possible also to bring to presentation this same totality. 
Here we have once again our old opposition between meaning and pre-
senting. What is new is this second opposition, between the execution 
of a function on the one side, and the presentation of that which is con-
stituted by the function on the other. 
Our principal aim is the clarification not of 'and', but of 'not'. Consid-
eration of the former has been of benefit however, since the relation-
ships associated with it are less complicated than and yet at the same 
time in several respects parallel to those associated with 'not'. For when 
I say 'a is not B' it is again impermissible to speak of a direction towards 
a not in the sense in which one can speak of a direction towards a, or 
towards B. Here too it is a function which is involved. In the case of 
'and' we spoke of a 'connecting' function; here we have a function 
which we can designate as a 'negating'. But whilst in the former case 
there are always at least two objects which become connected together, 
the negating function is set to work on only one objectual something. Its 
locus of action can be very precisely determined. Neither a nor B can be 
negated, but only the being B of a. In our example therefore the nega-
ting function relates particularly to the 'is', and therefore at the same 
time it relates to the whole state of affairs, a is B which becomes consti-
tuted, articulated and [thereby] modified in its form, through the execu-
tion of the judgment. To this extent the old scholastic thesis is perfectly 
correct: in propositione negativa negatio afficere debet copulam. 
Clearly we must make a distinction here also between the function, 
that to which the function is applied, and that which is constituted or de-
veloped in this application. For as the is in the state of affairs becomes 
negated, there develops the contradictory-negative state of affairs a is 
not B. It is not altogether easy to picture clearly to oneself the situation 
here. The negating function itself has to be securely grasped as that 
which corresponds to the 'not', but so also has the fact that this function 
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is applied to that element of the state of affairs which finds its expres-
sion in the 'is'. This 'is' becomes negated and transmuted thereby into 
an 'is not'. Thus by means of the negating function there arises the neg-
ative state of affairs. This latter is itself in no way brought to mind in the 
ordinary course of our thinking; it is as though the advance of our mean-
ing acts leaves it behind. But it is at all times open to us to bring it to 
mind in new acts of presentation and thereby to apprehend it as that 
which is constituted for us through our act of negation. Thus we have 
the meaning and the presenting of the negating function, and we have 
also the meaning and the presenting of the negative state of affairs 
which has become constituted for us through this function. And finally 
we have the opposition with which we are here concerned between the 
execution of the negating function and the presentation of the negative 
state of affairs thereby constituted. 
The expression 'constitution' should not be misunderstood; its use 
should naturally not imply that negative states of affairs are somehow 
created or manufactured through the negating function. For we know 
that negative states of affairs subsist precisely as do positive states, 
quite independently of whether or not they are presented to anybody or 
come to be apprehended, believed, meant, or asserted. That 2 x 2 is not 
equal to 5, this state of affairs, subsists wholly independently of any 
conscious subject which may grasp it, just as much as does the positive 
being identical of 2 x 2 and 4. Thus precisely as in the case of positive 
states, so also negative states are apprehended (though on the basis of 
the apprehension of positive states), and in this apprehension is found-
ed the belief or conviction in them. If states thus believed are subse-
quently brought forward in acts of assertion, then in the case of positive 
states the latter are built up from acts of meaning of objectual elements. 
In the case of negative states, in contrast, this building up requires the 
execution in the meaning-sphere of a function which negates certain 
meant elements. This therefore is the sense of the expression 'constitu-
tion': not that states of affairs in themselves are generated through the 
function of negation, but rather that by means of this function they are 
built up in and for the act of meaning. 
§ 16 The Moment of Assertion 
Let us turn once more to our original question. Since according to our 
exposition there occurs in the negative judgment a negating or denying, 
361 
so one could say also that the negative judgment is to that extent itself a 
denial [Verneinung ), and that we ourselves have overturned our original 
scruples in regard to this thesis. But this is completely to misconstrue 
the situation. For the division of judgments into affirmations and de-
nials involves, after all, much more than the claim that there exist 
judgments with and without denials. What one wants to claim is that in 
the notion of denial the essence of the negative judment as a judgment 
is completely captured, that it is sufficient to characterise something as 
a denial in order for it to qualify thereby as a judgment - and it is precise-
ly this which we must call into doubt. This doubt finds complete cor-
roboration in our analysis in terms of functions. It is not true that the 
notion of denial captures all that pertains specifically to judgments in 
the negative case; for there exist formations in which a denial is to be 
found which are not judgments at all. Consider the case where in re-
sponse to the judgment 'a is not B' we say: 'a is not B; that I doubt very 
much.' A denial is certainly present in this response, but one cannot se-
riously speak of the presence of any judgment 'a is not B' which is 
somehow revoked in the second half of the sentence. A genuine, com-
plete assertion is clearly not to be found in the antecedent clause. Thus 
we have here a case of denial which is not a judgment. And such 
examples can be mUltiplied: 'Is a not B?', 'Suppose a were not B .. .', 
etc. Everywhere we can find denial in the absence of judgments. 
Now one may very well say that 'denial' was not meant in this sense. 
In the sentence ~a is not B; that I doubt very much' and in the other ca-
ses mentioned there is no denial, no negating act, present at all. Some-
thing further must be added in order that the sentence be turned into a 
judging denial. With this we can do nothing but agree. But what is it 
which is to be added? If we compare our sentence with the judgment: 'a 
is not B', then we see very clearly what this should be. What is there 
merely repeated, put forward without being honestly asserted, is here 
truly asserted. Thus it is the moment of assertion which makes the neg-
ative judgment, just as much as the positive judgment, into a judgment 
at all. 
We shall therefore say that there are assertions in which no negating 
function is to be found - these are the so-called positive judgments. 
And there are also assertions in which the copula of the state of affairs, 
and thereby the state of affairs as a whole, is negated. In the negating 
function a negative state of affairs becomes constituted, and it is the 
negative state thus constituted which is put into question in the negative 
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question, assumed in the negative assumption, and finally asserted in 
the negative judgment. On the other hand there is no 'act of affirma-
tion', and just as little is there an 'act' of negation in relation to which 
we should have to seek the essence of the negative judgment. Much 
rather do both the positive and the negative judgment present them-
selves as assertions; and the negative is distinguished from the positive 
judgment only in this, that in the former the assertion relates to a neg-
ative states of affairs which becomes constituted in the execution of the 
negating function. It is this negating function which makes the negative 
judgment into a negative judgment - and it is the moment of assertion 
which makes it into a judgment at all. 36 
We spoke at the beginning of the difficulty for traditional theories of 
judgment of exhibiting the feature which makes purported acts of af-
firmation and of denial into judgments. Such difficulties do not arise for 
our conception. Positive and negative judgments are judgments in vir-
tue of their possession of the specific moment of assertion. The term 
'positive judgment' does not somehow imply the presence of a special 
act of affirmation or a special affirmation-function, but merely the ab-
sence of the negating function. A welcome corroboration of this is pro-
vided by the fact that where our language exhibits a 'not' as the expres-
sion of negation, there is, in the case of the positive judgment, no spe-
ciaJ particle which would give expression to a corresponding function of 
'affirmation'. The traditional conception of positive and negative judg-
ments is unable to provide an explanation of this peculiarity of lan-
guage. 
§ 17 The Pure Logic of Emphasis 
Our conception throws immediate light on the simple negative judg-
ment. But how does it fare in the case of the polemical negative judg-
ment which we distinguished above? If I turn against someone who has 
asserted the being B of a with the words: '(No.) a is not B', then it seems 
hardly possible to deny that here a rejection or a deniaJ plays an essen-
tial role. And indeed we do not wish to deny this at all. But we have to 
insist that the various factors involved here are kept strictly apart. 
What strikes us first of all about the polemicaJ judgment is what we 
shall call its accentuated ness or emphasis. For in contrast to the simple 
negative judgment the 'not' here is emphasised. It would be very super-
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ficial thinking to want to consign this emphasis exclusively to the sphere 
of linguistic utterance. For whilst, certainly, there is such a thing as spo-
ken emphasis which is related purely to the sounding of words, this em-
phasis is only the expression of emphasis in our initial, logically signifi-
cant sense. What purely phonic emphasis achieves in speaking is 
achieved in printed or written sentences by the use of bold or italic print 
or underlining of the word in question. Each of these different modes 
of expression gives expression to one and the same thing, and it is 
this identical thing which is our present concern. This finds support also 
in the fact that the spoken emphasis of one and the same word can serve 
to give expression to the logically significant emphasis of different 
things. Consider the judgment 'a is B' , which may on one occasion con-
tradict the assertion 'a was B' and on another the assertion 'a is not B'. 
Through the emphasis of the same word 'is', what is emphasised is in 
the first case the current temporal moment which the 'is' expresses, and 
in the second case the positivity of 'is', as something which is opposed to 
the 'is not'. This second, logical emphasis is surely something primitive, 
not further reducible. It does not contribute to the constitution of the 
element which is emphasised; but it must also he very strictly distin-
guished from any 'heeding' or 'apperceiving' of that element, for such 
acts have their place not in the sphere of meaning an object but in that 
of presentation. Here we shall not be able to pursue the important pro-
blems of emphasis nor investigate the laws to which it is subject, but 
shall set forth only that which is indispensable for our purposes. 
There is, first of all, emphasis which occurs in the simple meaning of 
an object: 'the rose (not the tulip) is red'. And then there is also empha-
sis which relates to what we called functions; 'a and b (not a alone) are 
C'. Here it is a connection which is emphasised; in the execution of the 
and-function that which is constituted, i.e. the specific moment of con-
nectedness of the totality, undergoes an emphasis. And similarly we 
find that besides simple negation there is also an emphasised negation: 
here what is emphasised is the negativity of the negative state which is 
constituted in the execution of the negating function. All judgments 
carrying emphasis presuppose the existence of something against which 
this emphasis is directed. Emphasised negation, in particular, is neces-
sarily directed against another contradictory judgment or sentence 
which is rejected by the judging subject.37 Thus the polemical negative 
judgment is distinguished in two respects from the simple negative 
judgment: it presupposes some contradictory positive judgment (or a 
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contradictory positive sentence), against which the polemically judging 
subject is directed and which he rejects; and - connected closely with 
this - it is such that an emphasis is built into the execution of its nega-
ting function through which the negative character of the state of affairs 
is set into relief relative to that opposing positive judgment. The rejec-
tion is directed against the alien judgment, the emphasis relates to the 
negative state of affairs posited by the subject himself.38 
Through this distinction the situation which was at first problematic 
is now clarified. The polemical negative judgment, too, must indubit-
ably be characterised as an assertion; this is not affected at all by the 
fact that, thanks to the emphasis which is applied, the negating function 
emerges more strongly here than in the simple negative judgment. 
There are, admittedly, other formations which are not judgments and 
yet which are such that the negating function plays the same dominant 
role (although for such formations the prior rejection of something con-
tradictory is missing). Consider for example the assumption: 'Suppose a 
were not B'. If we ask what distinguishes the assumption from the cor-
responding judgment, then we can point only to the moment of asser-
tion on the one side and to the moment of assumption on the other. 
That this situation has been misunderstood is very understandable. It 
was easy, first of all, to overlook the moment of assertion as something 
additional to a negating function made prominent through emphasis, 
and then - what is even more important - it became easy to mistake the 
rejection of the contradictory positive judgment which precedes the 
negative judgment for the negative judgment itself. 
Thus we see that also in the case of the polemical judgment it is the 
moment of assertion which makes up the judgment-character as such. 
And herewith we have broken with the old logical dualism which want-
ed to split up the unified assertion into two quite different acts, both of 
which would then - heaven knows why - carry the name 'judgment'. 
Thus we can agree completely with Theodor Lipps when he says (1906 
p. 168): "The negative judgment is, like the positive, an act of accept-
ance" - is, in our terminology, an act of assertion.39 
At the same time we have discovered amongst negative assertions -
which is what we may call all of those assertions in which a negating is 
to be found - a fundamental distinction: that between simple and po-
lemical negative judgments. The logicians have in the main treated only 
of the polemical negative judgments, which are so much nearer to hand 
because they are so much more common; in scientific contexts it tends 
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to be almost exclusively negative judgments of this kind which occur. 
Ideally speaking, however, every polemical negative judgment corres-
ponds to a simple negative judgment and conversely. 
The very same distinction can be carried through also with respect to 
positive judgments. For in addition to the simple judgment 'a is B' we 
have also the polemical judgment 'a is B' directed against a contradic-
tory negative judgment or a contradictory negative sentence, the positi-
vity of the corresponding state of affairs being brought into prominence 
through the emphasis on the copula. In this case everything is related in 
a way quite analogous to the case of the negative judgment, but here, in 
contrast, it is the simple positive judgment which in actuality occurs 
more frequently. Thus the distinction between simple and polemical 
judgments can be established for judgments in general (in so far, of 
course, as they belong to the sphere of assertion and not to that of con-
viction). 
§ 18 Sachverhaltselemente (The Elements of States of Affairs) 
The meaning of 'not' is not exhausted in its giving expression to the ne-
gating function. Functions of other types can also be bound up with it, 
without the judgment involved becoming branded as a negative judg-
ment. A theory of the negative judgment must however make reference 
to them, if only to ward off the possibility of their being confounded 
with that which is genuinely negative. One needs only to compare two 
judgments such as 'a is not B' and 'a is - not B (but rather C)' in order 
to disclose immediately a fundamental difference. At first one may well 
express this difference by saying that in the first case the 'not' relates to 
'is' and, in the second case to IB', so that in the former it is only the co-
pula which is affected, in the latter the predicate-constituent of the 
judgment. But clearly this is not an account with which we can be con-
tent. The question immediately arises whether the two are 'affected' in 
the same way. And this is indubitably not the case. For in the first case a 
negating occurs; the 'being [SUCh and such]' in the state of affairs is neg-
ated and a 'not being' is thereby constituted. In the second case, in con-
trast, there is, no possibility of talking of B becoming negated such that 
in this negation a non-B would be constituted. There is no such thing as 
a negative object, which would somehow become constituted in a nega-
tion. 
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We have an identical situation in the case of the judgment 'Not a (but 
rather c) is B'. Here too we have a 'not'; and here also there can be no 
suggestion that a negating occurs in which some kind of non-a would be 
constituted. There is clearly some function which lies before us here, 
but not a negating function; rather it is a 'retraction' or 'dislodgment'of 
something which has been intended in the flow of speech. 
We spoke earlier of the way in which in an assertion the state of af-
fairs is built up successively out of its elements. Now normally this 
building up goes through successfully without disturbances; the ele-
ments of the state of affairs follow upon one another, supplementing 
each other in a fashion which is similar to that of the tones in a melody. 
But there are cases where an element which interposes itself is then re-
tracted - and these are the cases in which 'not' functions in the manner 
just discussed. In regard to the genuine negative judgment there can be 
no talk of its being a dislodgment or retraction. 
There are very many different types of elements of states of affairs, 
both essential and inessential. For after all states of affairs, as these 
constitute themselves in assertion, cannot be simply stuck together, as it 
were, out of arbitrary elements: they are rather subject to definite laws 
of constitution. In particular, when the building up of a state has once 
begun, this cannot be arbitrarily broken off or brought to an end but 
demands the addition of definite elements, elements prescribed by laws 
relating not to content but to form, quite parallel to the situation which 
we encounter in the building up of a melody. We cannot, for example in 
the case of a state of affairs which has begun with 'the rose is', arbitra-
rily break off at this point; some element or other, perhaps of the form 
of [a predicate] B must join up to complete it, and that element is, to 
that extent, a necessary element of the state of affairs. In the judgment 
'the car has travelled quickly', in contrast, the 'quickly' is not a neces-
sary element but rather one which is inessential to the formal constitu-
tion of the state of affairs. Now elements of states which are retracted 
through the above-mentioned use of 'not', when they are necessary 
elements, require to be replaced by others of the same form: Not a -
but rather c - is B; a is - not B, but rather C. In the case of inessential 
elements of the state there is, in contrast, the possibility of retraction 
without replacement: The car was - by no means quickly - driven. 
Of course those judgments in which a retraction function occurs are 
not to be designated as negative judgments, for in them there is no 
negating to be found, and nor - what comes to the same thing - is a 
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negative state of affairs asserted in them; nothing more is involved than 
the retraction of an element, its exclusion from the state which is in the 
course of being built up. In the judgmen 'a is - not B, but rather C,' a 
positive state of affairs, the being C of a, is asserted, and the fact that 
within this act of asserting there occurs the retraction of a statal element 
cannot alter this at all. 
The concepts which we have introduced in this section have their 
place exclusively in the sphere of assertion, not in that of apprehending 
conviction. This holds above all for the concept of function. Whilst in 
the assertion 'a is Band C' we posit, thanks to the connecting function, 
one single state of affairs, in the sphere of apprehending conviction it is 
two states of affairs which come to presentation, for in this sphere there 
is no connecting, (no connectional meaning). And we have an analo-
gous situation for each of the remaining functions. Each of them arises 
only in the sphere of assertion. Certainly the application of such func-
tions is not arbitrary: they must find their support and justification in 
the states of affairs themselves and in the relations between them. Only 
when a negative state of affairs obtains is a negating function permitted 
to be activated within an assertive meaning act. Only when there are 
states which stand in definite relations of foundation or of opposition 
do the functions of 'hence' and 'but' acquire a justification. 
The distinctions between being emphasised and unemphasised, be-
tween the simple and polemical negative judgment - and between both 
of these and the judgment which involves merely the rejection of a sta-
tal element - have their place only within the sphere of meaning and 
not in that of apprehending. Once this has been clearly seen, it can no 
longer be doubted that the division of the judgment into apprehending 
conviction and assertion carries with it a division of the theory of judg-
ment into two parts, each requiring quite separate treatment. 
IV The Locus of Negation 
§ 19 Subjective and Objective Aspects of Negative Judgments 
We wish briefly to express our view concerning some principal prob-
lems which have developed around the negative judgment in the his-
torical development of logic, and thereby once more to throw into light 
the most important of our results. One thing which is much disputed is 
the locus of negation: is it a 'real relation' or something 'purely subjec-
tive'? In regard to such an ambiguous question a one-sentence answer 
cannot be supplied. If it is a matter of whether negation is to be sought 
for on the 'side of consciousness' or on the objectual side of the judg-
ment, then we must say that it is possible to speak of negativity on both 
sides. In the sphere of apprehending conviction there is disbelief, i.e. 
negative conviction, and in the sphere of assertion there is the negating 
function. Both are 'subjective' insofar as they belong to the side of 
consciousness. However beside (negative) disbelief there is also (posi-
tive) belief in something negative (in a negative state of affairs); and 
further the negative state of affairs to which assertion is related is con-
stituted in the function of negation. Here, clearly, we have negativity on 
the objectual side of the judgment, and it is to that extent 'objective'. 
But talk of the alleged subjectivity of negation has another, quite dif-
ferent sense, one which has been confounded with the above. Even 
someone who admits that a negative entity can function as the objectual 
correlate of conviction and assertion may yet go on to say that this neg-
ative entity is nothing 'real', that even though it is not something which 
is located on the side of consciousness, it is yet something which is es-
sentially dependent upon consciousness and which to that extent does 
not possess any objective being. We must, however, reject such an opi-
nion in the sharpest possible way. Certainly there is no real 'relation' 
which is posited in the negative judgment - but just as little need this be 
the case in the positive judgment. Judgments, both positive and nega-
tive, refer much rather to states of affairs. These states divide into posi-
tive and negative and both of these in turn divide into subsistent and 
non-subsistent. If a state subsists then its subsistence is independent of 
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all consciousness; there is absolutely no justification for offering an ex-
planation of precisely the negative state of affairs as being dependent 
upon consciousness. The denial of objective subsistence to all states of 
affairs whatsoever, that is the absurd position of absolute epistemologi-
cal scepticism; for states of affairs are, after all, what is apprehended 
and judged. He who does not subscribe to this scepticism is not allowed, 
either, to deny the subsistence of negative states, for the objective sub-
sistence of both are bound together by laws. This is stated with full 
force in the fundamental principles of logic: of two contradictory states 
of affairs, either the positive or the negative state must subsist. And: if a 
positive state does not subsist, then of necessity the contradictory nega-
tive state does subsist. 40 
§ 20 Negation of the Predicate and of the Copula: The Doctrine of 
Infinite Judgments 
The question concerning the locus of negation is contestable in yet an-
other dimension, distinct from those so far discussed. Distinguished lo-
gicians have declared that, in the judgment, negation attaches not to the 
copula, but rather to the predicate, that is, in the case of the judgment: 
'a is not B' , not to the being B but rather to B itself. We hold this con-
ception to be completely erroneous. In the sphere of apprehending 
conviction, first of all, it finds absolutely no foothold. For if, on the ba-
sis of my discerning the being red of a rose, I apprehend that the rose is 
not white, and my conviction relates to this latter state of affairs, then 
we have no function at all, no 'not', which could act upon anything, 
whether predicate or copula; a simple negative state of affairs is appre-
hended by us. It is only in the sphere of assertion that a negation-func-
tion is to be found; but there it acts upon the copula, not somehow upon 
the predicate ' B'. This becomes all the more clear when we reflect upon 
a case where 'not' truly relates to the predicate, for example in the as-
sertion: 'a is - not B, but rather C'. Here it is indeed the predicate-ele-
ment which is 'affected', but this affecting is a retracting from the state 
of affairs, not a negating. 
Once it has been recognised that the negating-function can relate 
only to the copula, then it also becomes untenable to talk of 'limitative 
judgments' or of propositiones infinitae, where negative objects are 
supposed to function as predicates, or subjects, of positive judgments, 
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('the rose is non-red', 'non-smokers take their places in this section', 
etc.). Here the logician has allowed himself to be misled by the [form of 
the ] linguistic expression which is involved, for there just is no such 
thing as a negative red or a negative smoker. If we remove the ellipses 
which lie before us here then our judgments read: 'the rose is some-
thing non-red (i.e. something that is not red)' and: 'the non-smokers 
(i.e. those who do not smoke) ... '. In both cases it is states of affairs 
which are negated, though certainly states of affairs which are not 
themselves asserted in the judgments in question but which have rather 
suffered peculiar transformations - of a type not here further discussed 
- in their subject- and predicate-places, respectively. 
§ 21 Concluding Remarks 
Let us now cast one final glance at the thesis according to which the 
negative judgment always has as its presupposition an executed or at-
tempted positive judgment, and that it presents itself to us essentially as 
a rejection of this positive judgment, a thesis which has been so much 
discussed especially since Sigwart's 1904 (see also Erdmann, 1907, 
p. 504 ff.; Bergson, 1907, p. 311 ff.; and Maier, 1908, p. 272 ff.). Here 
there are, it seems to me, all kinds of observations - both correct and 
incorrect - mixed up together. 
Recall, first of all, our discovery that every apprehending negative 
conviction (every disbelief) and every apprehending positive conviction 
(or belief) in something negative presupposes the apprehension of a po-
sitive state of affairs. Here there can be no talk of the negative judg-
ment's presupposing a positive judgment, for the apprehension of a po-
sitive state of affairs is not identical with conviction or belief in it. Or 
recall, secondly, the fact that both negative conviction and positive con-
viction in something negative have as their psychological presupposi-
tion certain intellectual position-takings. Only in the case of negative 
conviction is this position-taking directed towards a positive state of af-
fairs. And moreover whilst this position-taking can be one of convic-
tion, and thus also a judgment about the positive state involved, it may 
just as well be one of conjecture, doubt, etc. (See also Windelband, 
1884, p. 177.) 
Thus the thesis that every negative judgment presupposes a positive 
judgment must be restricted to one case only, that of negative convic-
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tion - and even there it need not necessarily apply. But what is wholly 
to be rejected in the sphere of conviction is the stronger claim according 
to which the negative judgment is precisely a judgment about such an 
attempted or executed positive judgment (Sigwart, 1904. p. 159). For 
of course a negative conviction does not relate to a judgment at all, but 
to a state of affairs. 
This second claim reveals that a covert move has been made from the 
sphere of conviction over into the sphere of assertion. For in the latter 
sphere there are indeed, as we know, negative judgments directed 
against contradictory positive judgments which they deny. Certainly the 
objectual correlate of the negative judgment is in this case too the posi-
tive state of affairs; but nevertheless there is here a good sense in which 
we can say that the negative judgment presupposes a positive one. 
against which it is directed. We would take exception to this only in 
pointing out that it is not the negative judgment in general which is here 
involved, but only the negative assertion, and even then only the pole-
mical negative assertion.41 
The simple negative judgment, as we have seen, does not have as its 
presupposition a positive judgment which it rejects or denies. And neg· 
ative judgments of this type play such an important role, especially in 
descriptions and narratives, that it is a clearly thoroughly one-sided 
conception of the negative judgment to suppose, with Kant and many 
others, that the negating judgment 'serves solely to guard us from erN 
rors' (A 709). 
Notes 
1 From its very beginning logic has met with great difficulties in its treatment of the neg-
ative judgment, difficulties which have still by no means been successfulJy resolved: 
extensive differences persist within the most diverse schools of thought. Only part of 
these difficulties touch on the negative judgment as such; for the other part they result 
from the fact that the positive judgment has not yet successfully been determined in an 
unequivocal way. And as long as the concept of judgment itself suffers from equivoClil* 
tion and unclarities, so also will the treatment of the negative judgment. In the follow-
ing paper the attempt will be made not to solve the problem of the negative judgment 
in all its aspects but to bring this problem nearer to a solution in certain direction~ . 
First of all however the scope of our present problems dictates that we begin with 
some considerations of judgments in general. 
Since I must limit myself, in what follows, to the exposition of what is most necessary 
to my subsequent goal, I have almost completely dispensed with discussions of the re-
levant literature. 
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1 It is clear that consenting relates to the judgment not only in the sense of the act of 
judgment but also in the sense of the judgment-content. It is not necessary, however, 
that we should carry through here the somewhat difficult differentiation involved. 
) This is the case also, perhaps to an even greater extent, with the term 'approval' 
l'Billigung' l which is employed by Windelband to designate the judgment: 1884, pp. 
167ff. 
4 That it won't do to characterise the two cases as cases of 'mere utterance of words' , 
only the first of which rests on an associated conviction , which is absent from the se-
cond, will be shown by the discussions which follow. 
S Brentano himself of course speaks of a presentation 'in the widest possible sense' 
(1889, p. 15). 
6 'Vorstellung' in the sense of 'imagination' -Tr. 
7 [Dasein ] Clearly one cannot confuse this existence or 'being there' with that which is 
involved in an object's being there expressly face-to-face: we cannot speak of e.g. that 
which belongs to the background of perception as being there in this latter sense. Cf. 
Theodor Conrad, 1911, p. 57. 
8 On this see Lipps, 1906, pp. 113ff., and Husserl, 1900/01 , II, p. 129f. 
9 Here we ignore so-called 'intuitive word-presentation', since we are concerned exclu-
sively with meaning or intending objects. 
10 We clearly do not wish to conceal the fact that wherever an assertion is made by an 
empirical consciousness there will usually be much more involved than acts of meaning 
of a particular kind. 
t j Thus, to mention only one example, we have spoken here of meaning as something 
which occurs with the understanding utterance of words but not of those related occur-
rences involved in the understanding hearing of words. The latter cannot themselves 
be designated as acts of meaning since they do not exhibit any spontaneous 'direction 
towards' but rather a receptive 'taking in' . Nor, however, are they acts of presentation, 
since that to which this understanding is related is not, in the pregnant sense, 'there', to 
the subject, or at least need not be there. 
12 O. Lipps, 1906, p. 230f. 
\3 This expression for the judgment as such distinguished from the objectual something 
to which it is related is readily understandable. It would clearly be more correct to 
speak of the intentional ~ide of the judgment. 
14 Instead of depending upon the relations of subsistence and inherence (for physical 
things) one may attempt to appeal to the more general relation of belonging together, 
assigning this to our third judgment. Thus Marbe (1910, p. 5) holds that the judgment 
'the rose is red' refers to the relation of belonging together which holds between the 
redness and the rose. But once more we have to object that the judgment 'the rose be-
longs to the redness' is different, in its meaning, from the judgment 'the rose is red'. 
The former is, for example, reversible ('the redness belongs to the rose'), the latter 
not. And if one wishes to designate such differences of meaning as trivial, still this tri-
viality of meaning-differences does not make them meaning-identities. We are of the 
firm conviction that if we are to arrive at a solution to the problems which here con-
cern us we must pay the most careful attention to displacements of meaning of this 
kind, however insignificant they may be in other contexts. 
15 Reinach 's original reads: Kant spricht davon, daB er irgendein Problem 'vor' unbe-
rechtigt halte, heute verbietet uns das der Sprachgebrauch. - Tr. 
16 A controversy has arisen with regard to this concept; for the literature see Meinong, 
1910 p. 98ff. In his treatise on "Appearances and psychic functions" 1907, Stumpf 
remarks that already three decades earlier Brentano had emphasised in his logic lec-
tures that there was a specific judgment-content [Urteilsinhalt ] corresponding to the 
judgment, that it was something distinct from the presentational content (or Materie) 
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and that it \\ a ~ l'xp r L~s l: d h[} ~ ui~tlc;llIy in 'that' - dausL' ~ 01 III -; uiJsta ll tivlsed infi nitili l'" 
Stumpf him self, a~ he rej1'lrh, alreadv in hi s Ic ct LJrc~ ill I KKK heg,lI l t() em pl oy th e l'\ 
prcssion 'statc of afbirs' 'Si/cln 'l'rluil, , fl)r hi~ spccific judglllcnt -L·or1 tl' nt. The d et " iI ~ 
of how HrL' nt ~HJO and Stumpf dc veloped their concepts of judgment -content an d stalc' 
III ~tflairs arc unknown tu us. The l'(llll'\'pt of Judgmcllt -con tent as found III th c work Ilj 
Mart y. esp. in his II)() ~ , differs in all L' sselltial point-.. fr(l/lJ 11 11,. "tatL' o f affairs. 
We appeal r;lthl'l to Hus\ \.T I·s I.ogica/ 11I1 ·/'I//gIiIiOI/.I I qOO, (j I in whl eh the peculiarit \ 
and signifi L,;tllcc o f th c concept 01 state o f affairs W<l S first clearly and vigorously m,lde 
prlll1lillL' llt ill th e literatu re . Om determindt ions overlap ill pMt <ibn with those pe r 
tailling to th e cUIH.:ept of (/h f/'cril ',' empl oye d hy Meinong and hi s sdwol, howevel . 
thl're arc \'oll"idnahk divl' rge llces. Th l' l1lost fund<llllcntal ohjcction whi ch must h 
rai"eu a~ainst Mci nong ~L'l'I11\ to mc to hc that his co nccpt of oiljcL'livL' run" toge thc" 
th e tWII completely different c(lllcepts of plllposit ioll (i n the logical sellse) and state of 
"ff"ir') . It is imuffincnt to designa te the IHI1Pllsitillll , with Meinong , as a particuLl 1 
kind of ohjective 'whi ch li es hdllre us and is comprehended. heillg uttered . where PO\ -
si hk . and heing at th e ven k;ls t ,I') it Wl'rl' formulated in wonk II) I (), p. IO(). For tilt' 
nHlll1 L' l1t , IHlweH'r , we Illllst wait for thc resuits of la lL'l dis l' lhSiolls for th e def]lOflst ra 
tion of this thcsi s. h what fo llows we limit ourselves to ,I shmt indication of th\)sc pa') 
silge~ whnc I I lIsserl' " and MClIlong's ;I ccounts diff(T from or coincide with those givell 
here. 
1 7 1.lke wi"e, thuugh withollt the distlllction within Judgment in general of conviction and 
assertion, Husserl 190()/ ()l, I. p.1 2. II. pp .4K , 1,7S, ,11h1. . and Meillong. 19 JO. 
pp. 44, 4h, etc . 
I H See Meinong. I'JIO , pp. 21. 21h , etc. and d . Hus~er l already in his I l)()(VOI , l. 
pp. 242, 3h f., et c 
1'/ Meinong, 1910, p . KUft'.; Hu -;scrl. )9(J() / Ol. I. 13 f. , Jh . 
10 Ilu~sl'rl and MClllong tno speak respective ly of 'contradictory statr..\S of affairs' and 0 1 
'contradiL'tonl y opposed objectives': !LJ()()/ Ol , I , p . l)J f.; IlJIO, p. ')3 . 
," I ' rhi ~ l'nj ll c id c~ vvith ~Iu s~c r r ~ terrni n(.) logy, I 9()(}/O I. J I . p . 5l)X. MeinOfl!! too speak~ n ! 
suhsi~tL'rlt'I.' o f ohjectives, but he speaks ;ils() of suhsis tence in the casc (If uhj!'c!.\ such 
as numhers, shapes, dc., with respect to which we should prefer to "peak (If an (ideal ) 
1'), I.I/I'IICt' (d 191 () pp . 6"' , 74) . The fact that Meilwng III ce rtain circumstances i" pre-
pared to spcak ,,1St) of the truth and falsity of objcctives arises as a Ctlll ... e411enec of h i ~ 
running -togcther propositions and ~tates of affairs . Stiltes of afLlirs suhsist or fa il I I) 
subsist. Propositions are trUe or fal se. 
Husserl , who had lIsed the designations ' truc' and ' falsc' in the fir"t volume (If his to-
!; ICllI hll'l'srit:, (J/iot1l in application to states , allowed th cm to fall away as he carri ed 
thrllugh the differentiati o n between propllsitions and states. But the n we stil l. in tht· 
'>econd volumc, find that the expressIon 'validity' is so applied : this is another term 
which is hettcr avoided, since it too has its primary application in the sphere of propn, 
sninn .... He reaches complete clarity conce rning the tcrrn~ ' truth ', ' su hs istcnee' and 'be-
ing' only at pp . ':)LJ7 f. 
22 '"I'h at we ten d ill eve ryda y speech to understan d under 'state of affair\ ' onl y "fac tual on .. 
jecti ves' , i.e. suh ~ i s ting statcs of affilir~ (Mei no ng, I LJ I 0 , p . I () I) , sec ms to me to he nu 
allequak reason not to ret a in a term which - as Meino ng himself declarcs -- has th e 
advantage of bringing wi th it a ' living me<lninj! ', (Il)()') , p. 33). 
_: .i By "Ohjcclual forrnation' and 'entity ' ('gt'geflsliindlichc (; ehildc' and ' (; l'J.?ens{i.indli('h ~ 
kelt') we undcrstand here not onl y objects hut also states of affa irs . 
14 Whether there is, hesidcs the hrinRil1~ To nlilld of a \ta te of affairs . al sl) a bare pcrccp ~ 
hUll of a suhsisting state of affairs, i,c. onc which la cks an accompanying apprehension . 
i ~ a 4uestion the discussion of which would take us tOil far a fi e ld : it would however 
have to he answered in the affirmative . 
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1<; Given these arguments we cannot at all agree with Meinong when he claims that 'ob-
jectives' can be grasped only through judgments and assumptions (1910, p. 131 ff.). 
There is e.g. a (categorial) bringing to mind, a meaning, an apprehending, and a whole 
series of other acts in which states of affairs are grasped. 
16 It is accordingly inadmissible to regard apprehensio n, with Meinong, as something 
which is by nature true judgment (Meinong, 1904, p. 18). A 'true' conviction which 
has been built up on the basis of an act of apprehension is not itself an apprehension. 
And on the other hand not every apprehension need be 'true'. If I discern from afar 
the approach of a cyclist then speaking purely descriptively this is an apprehension, 
even should it be the case that in reali ty it is not a cyclist at all who is approaching but 
rather, say, a cow. 
27 !i.e. the being-something-or-other! - which is of course not to be confused with the 
subsis tence of the state. The two are so fundamentally different that the account of the 
objective which is given by Ameseder (1904, p. 72) and Meinong (1910, p. 61) as 
something which ' is being and has bei ng' can , in our opinion, lead only to confusion. 
Furthermore not every state of affairs allows itself to be portrayed without artificiality 
as a ' being' . Consider the states of affai rs i- di scussed in § 12 below - I which corres-
pond to the judgments 'i t is raining' or ' it is freezing'; 1 Reinach's own examples are: 'es 
wird getanzt' and' mich friert' 1. 
28 Ameseder 1904 suggests the designation Relate for relations in the second sense 
(p. 72 ). See furth er Husserl 1900/01 , II, p. 609, and Meinong 1910 p. 57 f. 
29 Thus Maier, in his Psychologie des em otionalen Denkens, defends the view that the 
Impersonalia 'it is warm', 'it is raining' , etc. J relate to conditions (and/ or processes) . 
.10 By 'evidence ' here we do not understand only the ideal case of absolute self-givenness 
but every givenness of states of affairs in acts of apprehension. 
31 It must be no ted th at the present discussion relates merely to immediate apprehension 
and to evidence which is directly attained . In the case of those negative judgments 
which are arrived at on the basis of deductive inferences the situation is quite different. 
.>2 Where we have to deal with the apprehension of ' relations' (in the sense of relational 
state of affairs) th an it is of course unnecessary - as Brunswig, 19 10, has exhaustively 
shown that either of the members standing in the relation be in any way brought to 
presentation . Rath er it may be grasped in a quite peculiar experience which Brunswig 
designates as a 'di rection towards' jRichtung aUf], an experience which is neither a 
presentation nor a me aning act in our sense. 
13 To the di ffere nt words ' nOE' , ·non'. 'nicht', and so on, there corresponds, of course, an 
identical function . 
34 Instead of spea king in each case of ' the function which is executed with the utterance 
of the word " and' " it is admissi ble to speak , more briefly, of 'the and-function ' . 
35 Already in his logic lectures for the summer semester of 1906 Pfander had spoken of 
'cognitive functi ons ' !Denkfunktiollen j with particular reference to ' and ' . 
.16 We ought , briefly, to draw attention also to the following. Just as apprehension grasps 
the apprehended state in its su bsistence iBestand !, so assertion brings forward the as-
serted ~ positive or nega tive - state of affairs in its subsistence, it fixes or establishes 
this suhsistence. One must be on one's guard against confusing this fixing of the subsist-
ence of a state with th e predication of subsistence of a state. 
n Those judgments and se ntences are called contradictory to which are correlated con-
tradictory states of affairs: there is an analogy here to the way in which we distinguish 
sentences and judgments according to their modality, even th ough modaliti es are , 
properly speaking, inherent only in the corresponding states of affairs. 
18 Here the necessity of our earli er distinction between 'rejection ' or 'denial' of a judg-
ment and 'negative judgment' becomes very clea r, for we have the two of them to-
gether, side by side. 
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39 Only thus, also, can it be understandable why for every judgment - in our now stan-
dard sense - there is an underlying positive conviction. Were the negative judgment a 
'denying', then it would have to arise out of a negative conviction in the state of affairs 
which it denied. 
40 It will be seen that these principles relate to states and their subsistence; the same 
holds for the other fundamental principles of traditional logic. These have normally 
been related to judgments, e.g.: two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct. 
This principle is certainly incontestable, but it is a derived and not a primitive princip-
le. A judgment is correct if the state of affairs corresponding to it subsists; and two 
contradictory judgments cannot both be correct because two contradictory states of af-
fairs cannot both subsist. The law pertaining to judgments thus obtains its foundation 
from the corresponding Jaw which relates to states of affairs. Attempts have been 
made from other quarters to relate this law not to judgments but to propositions. Two 
contradictory propositions, it is now said, cannot both be true. We acknowledge freely 
the difference between judgment and 'proposition in itself; but just as the proposition 
must be separated from the judgment, so also must it be separated from the state of af-
fairs. A proposition is true when the state of affairs which is correlated with it subsists. 
And two contradictory propositions cannot both be true because two contradictory 
states of affairs cannot both subsist. Thus here too the propositional law leads back to 
a law which relates to states of affairs. At the same time this provides an example 
which may indicate the sense of our claim above, that the major part of traditional 10-
gic will prove to have its foundations in a general theory of states of affairs. 
41 And clearly in this too there is nothing peculiar to the negative judgment as such, since 
there are of course positive polemical judgments in a precisely corresponding sense. 
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